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I. INTRODUCTION 
A patent derives value from its owner’s ability to exclude others 
from practicing the patent.
1
  If others could freely implement the 
patented technology without repercussion, the patent would be worthless.  
Industry standards, on the other hand, are valuable for precisely the 
opposite reason—they are valuable only if industry participants adopt 
them, and they gain value as they become more widely used.
2
  Because 
of these opposing sources of value, a natural tension arises when 
patented technology is incorporated into an industry standard.  The 
standard-setting organization wants broad implementation of the 
standard, but patent rights can interfere with implementation. 
A patent holder who owns a standard-essential patent (that is, a 
patent that covers some portion of an industry standard) wields a lot of 
power.  The patent holder can command exorbitant licensing fees—fees 
far exceeding market value—because anyone who wants to comply with 




To ameliorate patent holdup concerns, most standards-setting 
organizations, or SSOs,
4
 attempt to procure patentees’ licensing 
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commitments before adopting standards.  Specifically, most SSOs insist 
that their members agree in advance to license any standard-essential 
patents on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms.
5
  But this 
is a vague standard, and, predictably, patentees often disagree with 
implementers about whether offered license rates are in fact reasonable 
and non-discriminatory.
6
  Recently, these disagreements have prompted a 
spate of litigation, leaving courts to grapple with the task of determining 
the substantive obligations entailed in a patentee’s RAND commitment.
7
 
This Article examines the remedies available in RAND disputes 
through the lens of various remedial interests—specifically, the 
restorative, coercive, and protective interests.  In particular, it discusses 
the availability of injunctive relief and enhanced damages as remedies 
for an implementer’s infringement of RAND-encumbered patents.  In the 
course of this discussion, the Article also evaluates the rightful position 
of the parties involved and the impact that various remedies will have on 
the parties’ incentives toward or away from socially optimal behavior.  
Ultimately, the Article suggests—contrary to the arguments raised by 
other scholars—that courts can employ traditional remedial doctrines to 
resolve concerns about RAND-encumbered patents. 
Part I introduces the basic concepts behind the RAND commitment 
and reviews the terms typically found in such commitments.  Part II 
examines various competing views regarding the contours of RAND 
commitments, including the implied license view, the waiver view, and, 
most importantly for purposes of this Article, the contract view.  This 
Part also addresses how the remedies available to patentees for 
infringement of RAND-encumbered patents shape the RAND 
                                                          
 5.  RAND terms are sometimes also referred to by some SSOs as fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory terms, or FRAND terms.  See generally Steven M. Amundson, Recent Decisions 
Provide Some Clarity on How Courts and Government Agencies Will Likely Resolve Issues 
Involving Standard-Essential Patents, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 91, 93 (2013). 
 6.  See Press Release, Department of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of 
Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft 
Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd. (Feb. 13, 2012), 
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 7.  E.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1231–32 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Apple 
Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled by Williamson v. Citrix 
Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 
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Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-
1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–11 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). 
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commitment, and it analogizes RAND commitments to open-price 
contracts under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.  Part III 
provides a suggested remedial structure for cases involving RAND-
encumbered patents, discussing whether and when injunctive relief and 
enhanced damages should be available to the patentee.  Finally, Part IV 
surveys the methodology for judicial determination of a RAND licensing 
rate, including a suggested framework. 
A. Background of the RAND Commitment 
Standards are crucial in a connected society.  Consider a world 
without standards.  One brand of wireless device might work with some 
routers, but it might be incompatible with others.
8
  A person’s cell phone 
might work at home but not at work, or they may be able to call only 
individuals with the same brand of phone.  Standards assure 
compatibility across a broad spectrum of devices and manufacturers.  
The United States is home to approximately 50,000 private-sector 
standards developed by more than 600 organizations.
9
 
Standards can incorporate technology subject to hundreds or even 
thousands of patents,
10
 and a patentee holding one of these “standard-
essential patents,” or SEPs, stands to gain enormous leverage in licensing 
negotiations once its patent is incorporated into a standard.  The patentee 
could prevent competitors from implementing the standard even if its 
patent covered only a very minor part of the standard.  Consequently, the 
patentee could command supracompetitive licensing fees for its patent, 
based not on the value of the patented technology, but on the value of the 




The potential for patent holdup is a function of the value that 
                                                          
 8.  This situation arose, for example, after the FCC’s decision to open wireless communication 
in certain unlicensed bands.  As Judge Robart put it, “[t]he proprietary solutions were expensive and 
forced users to buy all networking components from the same manufacturer.”  Microsoft, 2013 WL 
2111217, at *49. 
 9. Overview of the U.S. Standardization System, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST.  (2013), 
http://www.standardsportal.org/usa_en/standards_system.aspx. 
 10.  See, e.g., Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *43 (3,000 claimed standard-essential patents in 
802.11 Wi-Fi standard); Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *86 (at least 2,500 patents essential to the 
H.264 standard); Lemley, supra note 3, at 152 (describing 6,000 claimed essential patents for 3G 
telecom in Europe). 
 11.  Lemley, supra note 3, at 153–54; see also Jorge Contreras, Remarks at the Fed. Trade 
Comm’n Workshop on Intell. Prop. Rights and Standard Setting: Tools to Prevent Patent “Hold-Up”, 
26–27  (June 21, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/tools-
prevent-patent-hold-ip-rights-standard-setting/transcript.pdf [hereinafter “FTC”]. 
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inclusion in a standard adds to the patentee’s right to exclude.
12
  In a 
normal negotiation for a patent license, a prospective licensee will never 
pay more than the incremental value of the patented technology over 
competing technology (that is, the value over the next-best alternative) 
plus any cost of licensing the competing technology.  For example, if a 
patented egg-washing machine could wash 8000 eggs a month, and it 
would cost $1000 to wash those 8000 eggs by hand (the next best 
alternative), then the licensee would pay no more than $1000 to license 
the machine.
13
  But, when a patent has been incorporated into a standard, 
adopting competing technology may no longer be a viable option for 
industry participants, both because the alternative technology would not 
be compatible with the standard and because the would-be standard 
implementer likely will have already invested heavily in standard 
compliance.  Consequently, a patentee wielding the threat of an 
injunction could demand exorbitant licensing fees.
14
  The RAND 
commitment alleviates this problem by assuring potential implementers 
that holders of SEPs will not engage in patent holdup.
15
 
Most SSOs require members to agree that they will license standard-
essential patents (“SEPs”) on RAND terms.
16
  The actual terms of 
RAND obligations vary from SSO to SSO,
17
 but they usually entail the 
patentee’s assurances that it will make licenses “available” to applicants 
on RAND terms,
18
 that it is “prepared” to grant licenses on RAND 
terms,
19
 or that it is willing to negotiate licenses on RAND terms.
20
  The 
                                                          
 12.  See generally Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232. 
 13.  In fact, it would pay less if there were any costs associated with maintaining the machine or 
lost goodwill in having to lay off employees. 
 14.  See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310–11 (3d Cir. 2007); Realtek 
Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (seeking an 
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 15.  Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209; In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 956 F. Supp. 2d 
925, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–11. 
 16.  Letter from David Heiner, Vice President and Deputy Gen. Counsel, Microsoft Corp., & 
Amy Marasco, Gen. Manager, Standards Strategy and Policy, Microsoft Corp., to Fed. Trade 




 17.  Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1231. 
 18.  See id. (describing the policies of IEEE); Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. 
C-12-03451 RMW, 2012 WL 4845628, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012) (IEEE bylaws sought Letters 
of Assurance that patentee “is prepared to grant a license to an unrestricted number of applicants on 
a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable terms and conditions”) (citation omitted). 
 19.  See, e.g., European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ETSI RULES OF PROCEDURE, 
ANNEX 6: ETSI INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS POLICY § 6.1 (2014). 
 20.  David L. Newman, “Going Once . . . Going Twice . . . Licensed Under the Most 
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Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC) requires its 
participants to agree to “offer to license on RAND terms to all Potential 
Licensees” any patent having standard-essential claims.
21
 
II. COMPETING VIEWS ON THE CONTENT OF A RAND COMMITMENT 
The language of the RAND commitment is familiar to those who 
have studied the regulatory tariff regime of public utilities and common 
carriers, which for many years were “required to offer their customers 
service under rates and practices that were just, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory.”
22
  To achieve this end, federal and state legislatures 
created commissions and required the carriers to file public tariffs setting 
forth their rates.
23
  Thus, the rates were fixed, and any deviation from the 
filed rates was prohibited.
24
 
The parallel to the regulatory tariff model would be for SSOs to 
require patentees to commit to license all adopters at fixed or 
predetermined rates (in essence, to post their prices).  But SSOs have 
resisted such a model out of dual concerns about antitrust liability and 
the alienation of some members.
25
  Thus, the RAND commitments 
required by SSOs have remained intentionally vague, and most SSOs 
have been content to require the RAND commitment ex ante and allow 
patentees and implementers to work out the specific terms ex post.  The 
“non-discriminatory” aspect of the RAND commitment has not 
engendered much debate,
26
 but the requirement that a patentee’s 
licensing offers or negotiations be “reasonable” has been fodder for a 
growing number of lawsuits in recent years.
27
  Commentators have taken 
                                                          
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Bidding Terms!”, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 139, 141 
(2013) (describing IPR policies of ITU). 
 21.  See JEDEC SOLID STATE TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, JEDEC POLICIES MANUAL, JM21R 
§ 8.2.4 (July 2015) (“Potential Licensees” is broadly defined: “All . . . Committee Members and 
non-members.”); Id. § 8.2.1. 
 22.  Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1330–31 (1998). 
 23.  Id. at 1331. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  FTC, supra note 11, at 10 (remarks of Commissioner Edith Ramirez).  At least two SSOs, 
however, encourage SEP patentees “to disclose the most restrictive licensing terms they would 
demand, including maximum royalty rates.”  Id. 
 26.  In the regulatory environment, “‘[n]ondiscriminatory’ limits any ‘unjust or unreasonable’ 
discrimination based on persons, classes of persons, or localities.”  Luke J. Burton, The Preemptive 
Effect of Federal Communications Act §§ 201-02 Postdetariffing, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 563, 563 
(2013) (citation omitted). 
 27.  See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1231–32 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled by Williamson v. 
Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 
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several different views on the obligations and restrictions resulting from 
a RAND-commitment. 
A. Waiver and Implied License 
There are three important views that scholars and litigants have 
articulated regarding the substance of the RAND commitment: the 
waiver view, the implied license view, and the contract view.  The 
waiver view suggests that the RAND commitment reflects an irrevocable 
waiver of the patentee’s rights to pursue injunctive relief or enhanced 
damages for infringement of the patent.
28
  The implied license view 
posits that the RAND commitment is an implied license to all 
implementers, so that the patentee “has only a contractual claim for a 
royalty [against an infringing implementer], not a cause of action for 




Certainly these views have conceptual appeal, not the least of which 
is the ease of implementation.  Under these views, the patentee has no 
substantive obligation toward the implementer (such as to make a good-
faith offer), and the implementer has no substantive obligation toward 
the patentee (such as to avoid willful infringement).  Thus, among other 
things, these views would eliminate contentious lawsuits about the 
patentee’s breach of its RAND commitment.
30
  Under the waiver view, 
the patentee may sue the adopter at any time, but its remedy will be 
limited to the reasonable royalty at a RAND rate, regardless of the 
infringer’s willfulness, and a prohibitory injunction will never be an 
option.
31
  Under the implied license view, the patentee merely has a 
contract claim for breach of the implied license at the RAND rate and, 
                                                          
No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. 
LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-
1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–11 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 28.  Doug Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1043 
(2010); see also Letter from Vaishali Udupa, IP Litig. Counsel, Hewlett-Packard Co., to Lisa R. 
Barton, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 15–16 (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/234/2013/01/Hewlett-Packard-Public-
Interest-Comments-337-TA-794.pdf (“[S]ome contend that even if exclusion orders are an 
inappropriate remedy for enforcing standards-essential patents as a general matter, such orders 
remain appropriate when the infringer (1) refuses to agree to pay a standard-essential patentee’s 
proposed reasonable royalty, (2) refuses to pay a court-ordered royalty, or (3) challenges the validity 
of the patent or argues non-infringement.  None of these situations warrants an exclusion order.”). 
 29.  Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1925 (2002). 
 30.  E.g., cases cited supra note 27. 
 31.  Lichtman, supra note 28, at 1043. 
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presumably, would have to pursue that claim periodically throughout the 
life of the patent.
32
 
Despite their conceptual appeal, courts have not adopted either of 
these views.
33
  The waiver view is difficult to reconcile with the 
traditional waiver description of intentional relinquishment of a known 
right
34
—many SSO participants would be surprised to learn that they had 
relinquished rights to injunctive relief, as demonstrated by many amicus 
briefs in Apple v. Motorola that argued for the availability of injunctive 
relief.
35
  Indeed, SSO participants’ efforts to add waiver language into 
their SSO policies have been unsuccessful and have generally met with 
strong resistance.
36
  And some SDOs have explicitly rejected the view 
that a RAND commitment creates an implied license,
37
 which, as 
Professor Lemley recognized, would leave state courts to adjudicate 
claims of infringement and patent validity in the form of a contract 
claim.
38
  Perhaps more importantly, as explained below,
39
 these views 
                                                          
 32.  Lemley, supra note 29, at 1925–26. 
 33.  See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled by 
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, 
Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1190 (W.D. Wash. 2013); see also Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for 
RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 909 (2011) 
(discussing considerations of injunctive relief in the RAND context); but see In re Innovatio IP 
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 956 F. Supp. 2d 925, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (opining in a related context 
that RAND is “comparable to the existence of a license, which is also a contractual commitment 
limiting the liability of a patent infringer”). 
 34.  Standard Indus., Inc. v. Tigrett Indus., Inc., 397 U.S. 586, 587 (1970).  Of course, waivers 
need not always be intentional—modern waiver doctrine includes some unintentional waivers.  See 
McKinney v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civ. No. 08-3769ADM/JSM, 2009 WL 1927818, at *3 (D. Minn. 
July 2, 2009); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 750 (Concise 4th ed. 
2012). 
 35.  See, e.g., Brief of Research in Motion Ltd. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, at 
14, Apple, 757 F.3d 1286 (Nos. 2012-1548, 2012-1549); Brief for Nokia Corp. and Nokia Inc. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal and in Support of Neither Party at 2, Apple, 757 F.3d 1286 
(Nos. 2012-1548, 2012-1549); Brief of Amicus Curiae BSA The Software Alliance in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Apple, 757 F.3d 1286 (Nos. 2012-1548, 12-1549).  Other amici argued 
that injunctions should not be available.  See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Fed. Trade Comm’n 
Supporting Neither Party at 14, Apple, 757 F.3d 1286 (Nos. 2012-1548, 2012-1549); Brief of 
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 29, Apple, 757 F.3d 
1286 (No. 2012-1548).  
 36.  Certain Elec. Devs., Including Wireless Commc’n Devs., Portable Music & Data 
Processing Devs., and Tablet Comps., Inv. No. 337-TA-794, USITC at 47–48 (July 5, 2013) (Final) 
[hereinafter “Certain Elec. Devs.”].  
 37.  Some SSOs’ IPR policies now specify that no implied license is granted by a RAND 
agreement.  See, e.g., Microsoft, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (“IEEE–SA Standards Board Bylaws state 
that ‘[n]o license is implied by the submission of a Letter of Assurance.’”) (citation omitted). 
 38.  Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1926 (2002).  Moreover, even if there is a basis for federal jurisdiction in the 
lawsuit, an appeal in the case would be to the regional circuit court, rather than the Federal Circuit, 
sacrificing the Federal Circuit’s expertise on issues such as validity and infringement.  Id.  But the 
jurisdictional issue may arise under the contract view as well, at least where the standard adopter 
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risk leaving the patentee with something less than a full RAND royalty in 
most cases by capping the implementer’s litigation exposure—and the 




B. The Contract View 
1. Overview of the Contract View 
The third view of RAND commitments is the contract view.  Courts 
for the most part have concluded that the RAND declaration is a contract 
between the patentee and the SSO, enforceable against the patentee and 
its successors-in-interest
41
 by standards-implementers as third-party 
beneficiaries.
42
  Under the contract view, courts interpret the RAND 
commitment as they would any other contract, and courts must determine 




Under the contract view, the RAND commitment is loosely 
analogous to an open-price contract that we see in other contexts.  For 
example, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code expressly permits 
parties to create a contract that omits the price term where they intend to 
do so.
44
  If the parties later cannot reach an agreement on the price, the 
court is left to adjudicate the price as “a reasonable price at the time for 
                                                          
sues the RAND-committed patentee for breach of the RAND commitment.  See Microsoft Corp. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1034–36 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a breach claim does not arise 
under the patent laws for purposes of Federal Circuit jurisdiction). 
 39.  See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 40.  This concern was the reason that Congress created enhanced damages.  S. Rep. No. 79-
1503, at 2 (2d Sess. 1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1386, 1387.  See also Panduit 
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978); Laura B. Pincus, The 
Computation of Damages in Patent Infringement Actions, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 95, 124 (1991); 
Mitchell G. Stockwell, Implementing eBay: New Problems in Guiding Judicial Discretion and 
Enforcing Patent Rights, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 747, 760 (2006) (all discussing 
concerns with a regime capping the infringer’s exposure at the rate of a reasonable royalty). 
 41.  Courts have uniformly allowed the RAND commitment to be enforced against successors-
in-interest to the patentee.  See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 956 F. Supp. 2d 925, 
933 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Michael A. Lindsay & Robert A. Skitol, New Dimensions to the Patent Holdup 
Saga, 27-SPG ANTITRUST 34, Spring 2013, at 34.  
 42.  See, e.g., Innovatio, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 933; Microsoft Corp., 963 F. Supp. 2d at 1181; 
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-CV-178-BBC, 2011 WL 7324582, at *10 (W.D. Wis. 
June 7, 2011); see also Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 6:11-
CV-343, 2014 WL 3805817, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2014). 
 43.  The Federal Circuit offered some support for the contract view, requiring district courts to 
tailor jury instructions according to the language of “the actual RAND commitment at issue.”  
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 44.  U.C.C. § 2-305 (2012). 
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delivery.”
45
  It is unsurprising that courts analyzing sellers’ obligations to 
act in good faith in setting prices in open price contracts under Article 2 




Open-price contracts risk creating holdup-type opportunistic 
behavior outside of the RAND context as well.  Consider Milex Products 
v. Alra Labs.
47
  Alra was a drug manufacturer that agreed to manufacture 
a large quantity of a new generic drug for Milex, a drug company.
48
  
Although the parties created an enforceable contract, they left the price 
of the drug to later agreement.
49
  Based on their agreement, Milex 
submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application to the FDA, naming 
Alra as the manufacturer.
50
  When the FDA approved the application and 
the parties began to discuss price, Alra insisted on what Milex believed 
was an unreasonable price and unreasonable conditions.
51
  The appellate 
court characterized the situation in holdup terms: 
We agree that the duty to bargain in good faith does not prohibit a party 
from bargaining to its own economic advantage.  However, it is not an 
unreasonable inference that with Milex “locked in” to Alra as the 
manufacturer, Bhutani [Alra] tried to take advantage of the situation to 
force Milex to accept terms that had not been contemplated in the 
original contract and were not economically feasible for Milex.
52
 
The court affirmed the trial court’s determination that Alra’s holdup 
behavior breached its implied duty of good faith imposed on every 
contract under the Uniform Commercial Code.
53
  As in Milex, courts in 
the SEP context can eliminate patent holdup behavior—a key concern of 
the RAND obligation
54
—by pointing to the patentee’s duty of good faith 
and fair dealing implied in the RAND commitment under the contract 
                                                          
 45.  Id. at § 2-305(1)(b) (calling for a reasonable price at the time for delivery if “the price is 
left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree”). 
 46.  Shell Oil Co. v. HRN, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 429, 435–36 (Tex. 2004); Casserlie v. Shell Oil 
Co., 902 N.E.2d 1, 5–6 (Ohio 2009); United Food Mart, Inc. v. Motiva Enters., LLC, 457 F. Supp. 
2d 1329, 1335–38 (S.D. Fla. 2005). 
 47.  Milex Prods., Inc. v. Alra Labs., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 1226 (1992). 
 48.  Id. at 1233. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 1228–29. 
 51.  Id. at 1230. 
 52.  Id. at 1234–35 (citation omitted). 
 53.  Id. at 1233–35; see generally U.C.C. §§ 1-304 (2014), 2-305 (2012) (Article 2 specifically 
imposes this duty on parties fixing the price under an agreement with an open price term). 
 54.  See In re Motorola Mobility, LLC at 3, F.T.C. File No. 121-0120 (Jan. 3, 2013) Dkt. No. 
68-2. 




While the analogy between Article 2 and the RAND commitment 
offers some useful guidance with respect to the patentee’s good-faith 
obligations, the analogy is not perfect.
56
  In the sale of goods context, the 
buyer knows whether he is using the seller’s tangible property, and the 
seller is also likely to know when the buyer is using his property.  But 
with patents, implementers often cannot be certain whether they are 
“using” the patentee’s property, because the patent may be invalid or 
may not read on the standard, even though the patentee claims that it is 
essential to the standard.  And, because of the non-rivalrous nature of 
intellectual property, the implementer may be able to use the patented 
technology without the patentee discovering the implementer’s use. 
2. The Contract View as It Relates to Opportunism 
A central purpose of the RAND commitment is to avoid patentee 
opportunism,
57
 and the contract view serves this purpose well.  Under the 
contract view, the RAND-committed patentee is obligated to negotiate 
with the implementer in good faith,
58
 and if it fails to do so, it can be 
liable for breaching its RAND commitment and could potentially even be 
subject to antitrust liability.
59
  But the RAND commitment is also 
intended to ensure that the patentee receives the value of its contribution 
to the standard,
60
 and this purpose will be disserved unless the 
implementers are somehow incentivized to negotiate in good faith 
toward a RAND license. 
The alternative views of the RAND commitment—the implied 
license view and the waiver view—disserve this second purpose if they 
lead to below-RAND negotiated licenses.  Under either of those views, 
the RAND rate sets the maximum recoverable damages for the patentee 
                                                          
 55.  See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 
2013); Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-03451 RMW, 2012 WL 4845628, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012).  This may depend on whether there is a duty of good faith and fair dealing 
implied in every contract in the particular state or country whose laws are used. 
 56.  Unlike tangible property, intellectual property is neither scarce nor rivalrous, so that 
multiple people can make use of it simultaneously. 
 57.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies 
for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments 5 (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ogc/Final_DOJ-PTO_Policy_Statement_on_FRAND_SEPs_1-
8-13.pdf [hereinafter Policy Statement]. 
 58.  See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 5373179, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. Sept. 24, 2013). 
 59.  Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007); Research In Motion 
Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 792–94 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
 60.  Policy Statement, supra note 57, at 8. 
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in an infringement action against the implementer.
61
  In that situation, 
implementers have no remedial incentive to reach a license with the 
patentee.
62
  If the most that a patentee can hope to get through litigation, 
and the most an implementer will have to pay as a result of litigation, is a 
RAND royalty, then implementers likely will only agree to license the 
patent for something less than the RAND rate, leaving the patentee short-
changed.
63
  This is known as patent holdout or reverse holdup.
64
 
The contract view of the RAND commitment risks suffering from 
the same shortcomings as the implied license view and the waiver view.  
The contract view—by imposing an obligation on the patentee to 
negotiate toward a RAND-rate license in good faith—risks exposing the 
patentee to reverse holdup unless the implementer is incentivized to 
reach a RAND-rate license.  This is where the available remedies come 
into play.  I argue in the next section that it is not necessary to create 
unique remedial doctrines in RAND cases to avoid both patent holdup 
and reverse holdup; the RAND commitment, coupled with careful 
attention to traditional remedial doctrines, can accomplish both of these 
ends. 
III. THE ROLE OF REMEDIES IN RAND COMMITMENTS 
Eliminating patent holdup without creating an environment 
conducive to implementer opportunism will require courts to strike a 
careful balance with respect to remedies available for infringement of 
RAND-encumbered patents.
65
  These remedies are “the subject of 
substantial, often contradictory, academic commentary”
66
 and court 
                                                          
 61.  See supra Part II.A.  Technically, under the implied license view, there would be no 
infringement action, but merely a quasi-contractual action against the implementer for payment of 
the RAND rate. 
 62.  Of course, implementers may experience moral pressures to seek a license because it is the 
right thing to do, or they may experience environmental pressures to seek a license to ensure a 
positive reputation in the industry and in the SDO, but they will not have any remedial pressure. 
 63.  See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties 
for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1153 (2013) (“A commitment to 
license on reasonable terms is not a commitment to be whipsawed by a potential licensee.”). 
 64.  See Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: Some Thoughts on the 
Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of Patent Licensing, 21 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1093, 1098 (2014); F. Scott Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar, Incentive Effects 
from Different Approaches to Holdup Mitigation Surrounding Patent Remedies and Standard-
Setting Organizations, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1091, 1097 n.18, 1107 (2013).  
 65.  Brief for Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 14-35393, 2014 WL 4802384 (9th Cir. 2014) 
[hereinafter Am. Intell. Brief].   
 66.  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2013).  
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opinions.
67
  Optimal remedies for infringement of RAND-encumbered 
patents should neither enable the patentee to extract supracompetitive 
licensing fees based on the value of the standard nor enable 
implementers to free-ride.  Relatedly, optimal remedies should encourage 
both parties to bargain in good faith in an effort to reach a RAND-rate 
license. 
To accomplish this goal, we must remove any incentives that the 
parties might have to resist agreement at the RAND rate.  Those 
incentives exist on the patentee’s side when it thinks it can force the 
implementer into an above-RAND license under threat of an injunction 
or enhanced damages.  Those incentives arise on the implementer’s side 
when it incurs no risk from committing knowing infringement (that is, 
when its liability after trial is limited to the RAND rate) and when it 
thinks that it can compel the patentee to enter into a below-RAND 
license (for example, because of litigation risks or expenses).  The proper 
balance of these remedies is the subject of this section. 
A. Restoring the Rightful Position 
Three oft-cited remedial goals of our justice system are to (1) restore 
the injured party to its rightful position (the restorative interest); (2) 
protect the rightful position of society’s members (the protective 
interest); and (3) coerce utility-enhancing conduct from society (the 
coercive interest).
68
  When it comes to restoring the patentee to its 
                                                          
 67.  See id.; Am. Intell. Brief, supra note 65, at *3 (noting that SSOs’ intellectual property rights 
policies are “carefully balanced to . . . advance two equally important goals: ensuring reasonable 
access to implementers who want to practice a standard, while providing adequate compensation 
through licensing of standard-essential patents”). 
 68.  Marco Jimenez, Remedial Consilience, 62 EMORY L.J. 1309, 1313–14 (2013).  I assume 
here that the patentee’s ability to monetize the patent has become part of the patentee’s “rightful 
position.”  Id.  For these purposes, it does not matter whether we value the patentee’s rightful 
position under an Aristotelian corrective-justice model or under a utilitarian model—under either 
view, restoring and preserving the rightful position are important policy goals.  DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, 
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 14–15, 304–05 (Concise 4th ed. 2012).  Conventional wisdom 
suggests that patents are primarily utilitarian.  See, e.g., David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis 
for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 
181, 182–83 (2009).  But there are some thoughtful arguments that Lockean theory supports patent 
rights.  See Adam Mossoff, Why Intellectual Property Rights? A Lockean Justification, LIBRARY OF 
LAW AND LIBERTY (May 4, 2015), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/why-intellectual-
property-rights-a-lockean-justification/.  This distinction may lead to differing views on what the 
positive law ought to be with respect to, for example, the patent term or independent creation but, 
once the positive law has answered these questions, the “rightful position” analysis is the same.  
Thus, “patent damage awards should reflect the economic realities of the market in which the 
patented technology competes by rendering the patentee no worse off, but also no better off, than it 
would have been absent the infringement.”  Michel, supra note 33, at 896. 
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rightful position for past infringement, all three of the RAND-
commitment views are in agreement as to the proper remedy: a RAND-
committed patentee will be restored to its rightful position by a RAND-
rate royalty payment. 
Depending on one’s view, a remedy for past harm aims to serve the 
restorative interest by restoring the injured party to its rightful position or 
the coercive interest by incentivizing utility-enhancing conduct, forcing 
the wrongdoer to internalize the cost of harm it inflicts on others.
69
  
Under either conception, this usually means providing a monetary 
award—measured as the value of that which the plaintiff lost—as a 
substitutionary remedy where in-kind relief is not possible, such as in the 
case of past patent infringement.  The normal measures of damages for 




In the ordinary patent infringement case, money damages can be a 
very poor substitute for the right to exclude, because of two 
uncertainties: we usually cannot know (1) whether the patentee would 
have been willing to license the infringer in pre-infringement 
negotiations for some amount of money and (2) whether the parties 
would have been able to reach an agreement on the licensing fees.  If 
money is incommensurable with the right to exclude (perhaps, for 
example, where the patentee found the implementer’s use morally 
objectionable and would not have licensed it for any price
71
) then no 
monetary remedy can truly restore the patentee to its rightful position.  
Similarly, if the patentee would not have agreed to license the infringer 
for any amount the infringer could pay, or for the amount determined by 
the court to be a reasonable royalty, the award is undercompensatory.  
This can occur because of the constraints of the reasonable royalty 
award, in which the infringer’s ability to pay and intended use of the 
patent may limit the amount that the factfinder determines to be a 
reasonable royalty well below the patentee’s valuation of the right.
72
 
                                                          
 69.  The coercive interest rests on the view that the law is significantly or entirely utilitarian.  
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 31–34 (9th ed. 2014).  This interest 
will depend in part on whether Congress has appropriately set incentives to invent and disclose 
through the patent laws, but this article assumes that those incentives are appropriately set.  See S. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PATENT REEXAMINATION, S. REP. NO. 96-617, at 9 (1980).  
 70.  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); Trell v. Marlee Elec. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 71.  Some would say this is not properly an uncertainty—that money and the right to exclude 
are always commensurable for some value.  See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Laconomics of Apples and 
Oranges: A Speculative Analysis of the Economic Concept of Commensurability, 15 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 347, 348–49 (2003). 
 72.  See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (extent of 
use); Century Wrecker Corp. v. E.R. Buske Mfg. Co., 898 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (N.D. Iowa 1995) 
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In the RAND context, however, we can be much more confident in 
the ability of money damages to restore the patent holder to its rightful 
position.  We know that the patentee must be willing to license all 
comers, so the first uncertainty is eliminated.  And, having made a 
RAND commitment, the patentee has informed us that it values standard 
incorporation plus a “reasonable and non-discriminatory” licensing 
rate—which it knows is subject to judicial determination in a dispute—
more than it values the right to exclude under its patent.  It has already 
received standard incorporation, so an award of a reasonable and non-
discriminatory license amount should restore the patentee’s rightful 
position.  That is not to say that the RAND rate is always easy to 
determine, but courts have long been engaged in calculating reasonable 
royalties, so that a damages award at a judicially determined RAND rate 
will likely approximate the patentee’s rightful position.
73
 
B. Protecting the Rightful Position 
All three RAND views are in agreement about the proper remedy to 
restore the RAND-committed patentee to its rightful position.  And, in 
theory, a patentee who is truly restored to its rightful position should be 
indifferent between avoiding the infringement altogether and being 
compensated after enduring the infringement.  But, in reality, plaintiffs 
will rarely be indifferent between the two, because litigation requires the 
plaintiff to invest non-recoupable resources in the process,
74
 so that the 
plaintiff is rarely fully restored to his “rightful position.” 
In patent litigation, the plaintiff can recover its attorneys’ fees only 
in “exceptional cases” and, despite the Supreme Court’s recent expanded 
gloss on the term,
75
 the plaintiff remains relatively unlikely to recover 
fees.
76
  This shortfall from achieving the rightful position post-litigation 
is a function of the American Rule, and it is hardly unique to patent 
                                                          
(ability to pay).  
 73.  See Trell, 912 F.2d at 1445.  This is especially true if, as I earlier posited, the RAND 
commitment entails an agreement to permit courts to determine the RAND rate where the parties are 
unable to agree, like an open-price term contract under the Uniform Commercial Code.  See supra 
Part II.B.1. 
 74.  See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 
59–60 (2007) (“[I]f transaction, administrative, and enforcement costs are zero, and if all parties 
have perfect information, then all parties would be indifferent between damages (a liability rule) and 
an injunction (a property rule).  However, in the real world parties do not have perfect information, 
and there are transaction costs.”). 
 75.  Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756–57 (2014). 
 76.  Under Professor Lemley’s implied license view, the patentee would have no grounds to 
recover fees, unless it is independently permitted by state contract law.  See Lemley, supra note 29, 
at 1925–26. 
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cases, but it is nevertheless a real cost borne by the successful patentee in 
an infringement action.  Further, even if the plaintiff recovers its 
attorneys’ fees, it is unlikely to recover all of them, because courts often 
reduce the fee award from the amount incurred.
77
  Finally, even if the 
plaintiff recovers all of its attorneys’ fees, it would still prefer a RAND-
rate license over RAND-rate damages because, during litigation, the 
plaintiff must divert its financial and human resources to assist in the 
litigation, engaging in such tasks as document searches, evidence review, 
testifying, meetings, and the like.
78
 
Moreover, the vast majority of cases settle.
79
  If the implementer’s 
consequences for infringement are equal only to payment at the RAND-
rate—the same rate that the infringer would be obligated to pay if it 
lawfully licensed the patent—the implementer has no remedial incentive 
to avoid the infringing conduct and license the patent.
80
  Its infringement 
might go unnoticed,
81
 in which case it pays nothing; and, if the 
infringement is discovered, its worst-case scenario is, after litigation, to 
simply pay the RAND rate that it would have been obliged to pay to 
license the patent ex ante.  In these circumstances, infringers, if their 
infringement is discovered, can safely expect to negotiate a settlement at 
a substantial discount from the RAND rate, even if validity and 
infringement are likely.
82
  As the Department of Justice and the Patent 
                                                          
 77.  Jeff A. Ronspies, Does David Need a New Sling? Small Entities Face a Costly Barrier to 
Patent Protection, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 184, 199 (2004). 
 78.  Pauline H. Tesler, Client Relations: Tips from A Collaborative Practitioner, 21 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 13 (2003) (describing indirect transactional costs of litigation). 
 79.  Andrey Spektor, The Death Knell of Issue Certification and Why That Matters After Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 165, 190 n.2 (2014) (describing study that estimated ninety-
seven percent of cases settle or are dismissed before trial). 
 80.  See Certain Elec. Devs., supra note 36, at 63 (“In reverse patent hold-up, an implementer 
utilizes declared-essential technology without compensation to the patent owner under the guise that 
the patent owner’s offers to license were not fair or reasonable.  The patent owner is therefore forced 
to defend its rights through expensive litigation.”). 
 81.  Professor Lichtman recognized this concern, but found it diminished because standard-
compliant products are usually marketed as such, meaning that patentees will often be able to 
discover infringing products.  See Lichtman, supra note 28, at 1041–42.  But standards are most 
useful when there are many players in an industry and many parties who would implement the 
standards that are adopted, making discovery of infringing products more difficult.  For example, as 
of February 22, 2015, an Amazon search for “802.11 router” (that is, a router that complies with the 
IEEE 802.11 standard) resulted in 8,850 hits, not to mention other wireless devices, such as 
computers, smart televisions, media streaming devices, gaming systems, and USB wireless receivers, 
which are also 802.11 compliant. 
 82.  As Judge Posner recognized, both parties would bear attorneys’ fees during litigation.  
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 915 (N.D. Ill. 2012), rev’d in part, 757 F.3d 1286 
(Fed. Cir. 2014).  But the patentee must spend significant fees and substantial discovery costs to 
recover, whereas the implementer need not mount an expensive defense if its approach is merely to 
use the patentee’s RAND commitment opportunistically—it can simply force the plaintiff to prove 
its case at substantial expense, and then accept its judgment of liability at the RAND rate.  More 
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and Trademark Office noted in a joint policy statement, “the risk of a 
refusal to license . . . increases where the putative licensee believes its 
worst-case outcome after litigation is to pay the same amount it would 
have paid earlier for a license.”
83
  This is particularly true because 
“information asymmetries appear most likely to disfavor the patent 
holder in negotiations, suggesting that . . . the patent holder will probably 
be substantially handicapped in its ability to achieve an especially 
favorable negotiated result.”
84
  Thus, in the absence of a remedial 
incentive for implementers to license the patent, the patentee will not 
achieve its rightful position, nor will the infringer fully internalize the 
societal cost of its infringement.
85
 
The protective interest recognizes that, at least in cases where the 
plaintiff will not be fully restored to its rightful position, we should 
attempt to avoid harm rather than to permit the harm but require 
compensation after the fact.  In most patent cases, two remedial 
mechanisms serve the protective interest.  The first is the court’s ability 
to award enhanced damages,
86
 and the second is injunctive relief.  But 
the implied license view and the waiver view would eliminate both of 
these remedies for infringement of RAND-encumbered patents.
87
  As 
discussed above, and as scholars have generally recognized, foreclosing 
these two remedies has significant drawbacks because, while eliminating 
patentee opportunism, it creates an environment conducive to 
implementer opportunism.
88
  The optimal solution should set a standard 
for enhanced damages and injunctive relief that would minimize 
                                                          
importantly, the patentee must discount for litigation risk much more substantially than merely the 
inverse of the infringer’s risk of patent validity, as described in more detail below.  See infra notes 
254–258 and accompanying text. 
 83.  Policy Statement, supra note 57, at 7 n.15. 
 84.  John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2133 
(2007). 
 85.  See generally Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing 
Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 915–18 (2008) (discussing law-and-
economics theory that tortfeasors pay damages to force them to internalize costs of wrongdoing). 
 86.  Congress’s express purpose in instituting enhanced damages was to “discourage 
infringement of a patent by anyone thinking that all he would be required to pay if he loses the suit 
would be a royalty.”  S. Rep. No. 79-1503, at 2 (2d Sess. 1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code 
Cong. Serv. 1386, 1387.  See also sources cited supra note 40. 
 87.  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Pat. Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 917 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 2013) 
(collecting commentators’ positions); Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access 
Lock-in: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 375 (2007); Lichtman, 
supra note 28, at 1048–49; see also John D. Harkrider, Seeing the Forest Through the Seps, 
ANTITRUST, Summer 2013, at 22, 23. 
 88.  See, e.g., Lichtman, supra note 28, at 1048–49 (“[U]nder my interpretation, RAND does 
little to encourage standard-setting participants to negotiate rather than litigate . . . . The upshot 
might be that patent holders who agree to the RAND commitment will in the end be 
undercompensated.”). 
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potential opportunism by either party.  The contract view, coupled with a 
careful application of traditional remedial mechanisms, is well suited to 
this end. 
Below, I consider the application of three potential remedies—
injunctive relief, enhanced damages, and an ongoing royalty—in the 
RAND context.  Prior discussions of the other views of the RAND 
commitment have simply treated injunctive relief and enhanced damages 
together; because they both serve the protective interest, they should 
either both be allowed or neither be allowed.  I argue that the traditional 
application of the elements of these remedies—as well as the goals of the 
protective interest and the policies behind the RAND commitment—
make enhanced damages the most useful of these remedies in the RAND 
context. 
1. The Prohibitory Injunction 
The prohibitory injunction can serve the protective interest in two 
distinct ways.
89
  First, an injunction against future infringement serves 
the protective interest by foreclosing future infringement after the 
injunction is entered—the injunctive command, enforceable on pain of 
contempt, works to ensure that the defendant will not infringe the patent 
in the future.  Second, the fear of injunctions may incentivize would-be 
infringers to seek a license rather than to attempt undetected 
infringement.  (This depends on the infringer’s need to invest non-
recoupable costs, such as re-tooling machines or purchasing supplies, in 
the infringement.  Would-be infringers will hesitate to invest such costs 




In the RAND context, partly as a result of the failure to distinguish 
between these two different ways that injunctions serve the protective 
                                                          
 89.  For utilitarians, injunctions, like all other remedies, serve the coercive interest.  Injunctions 
ensure that the wrongdoer negotiates for a voluntary transaction (a Pareto positive transaction in 
which net utility is enhanced) rather than unilaterally take the other party’s property (in which case 
we cannot know whether utility is enhanced following the judicial remedy).  This view of 
injunctions, while differing from protection of the rightful position qua rightful position, 
nevertheless aligns with the protective interest in terms of the normative role of injunctive relief. 
 90.  The threat of injunctive relief does not incentivize would-be infringers to seek a license if 
the infringers are not heavily tied down with sunk costs.  Thus, a seller who simply imports patented 
products, marks them up, and then resells them would not necessarily be disincentivized by the 
threat of an injunction.  In such cases, enhanced damages serve the protective interest in a way that 
injunctions do not.  See Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 122–23 
(9th Cir. 1968) (justifying disgorgement of profits in trademark cases because an injunction “does 
not necessarily protect . . . from similar . . . acts,” so that “the courts must . . . make acts of . . . 
deliberate trade-mark piracy, unprofitable”). 
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interest, “the question of whether a RAND obligation precludes an 
injunction is ‘muddled’ and ‘the subject of substantial, often 
contradictory, academic commentary.’”
91
  Consider the following 
examples of the wide array of commentary and judicial opinions.  In 
Apple v. Motorola,
92
 four federal judges—Judge Posner, sitting by 
designation at the trial level, and Judges Rader, Reyna, and Prost at the 
Federal Circuit—all differed with respect to whether and to what extent 
injunctive relief should be available in the RAND context.
93
  In a 
separate case, the Ninth Circuit found implicit in a RAND commitment, 
“at least arguably, a guarantee that the patent-holder will not take steps to 
keep would-be users from using the patented material, such as seeking an 
injunction.”
94
  Some commentators have argued that a RAND 
commitment precludes the patentee from seeking injunctive relief,
95
 
while others have argued in favor of retaining injunctive relief.
96
  And 
some courts have held that a patentee breaches its RAND commitment if 
it seeks injunctive relief without at least first making a good-faith 
licensing offer to the implementer.
97
  In a 2013 FTC consent order, 
Google and Motorola agreed not to seek injunctive relief for RAND-
encumbered patents unless the licensee refused to license the patent on 
any terms.
98
  The International Trade Commission, on the other hand, has 
been willing to issue injunctions where RAND-encumbered patents were 
involved, most famously in favor of Samsung against Apple.
99
  And the 
                                                          
 91.  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11C9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *11 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (citing In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 
916 (N.D. Ill. 2013)). 
 92.  757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 93.  See infra Part III.B.1.a. 
 94.  Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 95.  See Licthman, supra note 28, at 1042–43; Lemley, supra note 3, at 158; Letter from Bruce 
H. Watrous, Jr. on behalf of Apple to European Telecomms. Standards Inst. (Nov. 11, 2011), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/80899178/11-11-11-Apple-Letter-to-ETSI-on-FRAND (“Seeking an 
injunction would be a violation of the party’s commitment to FRAND licensing.”). 
 96.  See, e.g., Kieff & Layne-Farrar, supra note 64, at 1113. 
 97.  See, e.g., Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 
2013).  The damages from such a breach would presumably be the attorneys’ fees expended in 
fighting the claim for injunctive relief.  
 98.  In re Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., Docket No. C-4410, Decision and Order (July 
23, 2013), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724googlemotorolado.pdf. 
 99.  See id.; see also Certain Elec. Devs., supra note 36 (technically, the ITC issues exclusion 
orders, but they are functionally equivalent to injunctive relief); Letter from Ambassador Michael 
B.G. Froman to Hon. Irving A. Williamson (Aug. 3, 2013), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF (issued by United States Trade 
Representative Michael B.G. Froman to the ITC announcing President Obama’s disapproval of the 
ITC exclusion order, effectively reversing the ITC’s decision; the disapproval was based largely on 
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Department of Justice released a Joint Policy Statement with the Patent 
and Trademark Office arguing that injunctions should not usually be 




The concern about injunctions in the SEP context relates to the 
potential for patentee opportunism.  If an implementer is enjoined from 
practicing a patent essential to an industry standard, the implementer’s 
prior investments in the standard would be nullified, and the implementer 
would be effectively excluded from industry participation.  Thus, the 
threat of this injunction provides the patentee with leverage to extract 
supracompetitive royalties from the implementer.  But the injunction-as-
opportunism possibility is not unique to patent law—a plaintiff can use 
the threat of an injunction to extract the value of sunk costs in any 
situation where a threatened injunction would nullify those costs. 
The case of Whitlock v. Hilander Foods, Inc. offers an example of 
such a case outside of patent law.
101
  In Whitlock, the defendant grocery 
store began building a retaining wall whose footings extended eighteen 
to twenty inches onto Whitlock’s property, below ground.
102
  After 
Whitlock noticed the encroachment, the parties began negotiating for a 
lease or purchase of the property at issue, but were unable to reach a 
resolution.
103
  Whitlock sued, seeking an injunction that would have 
forced Hilander to tear down the newly constructed $1.5 million wall and 
build another one eighteen inches back.
104
  This would have allowed 
Whitlock to command a premium for his property rights, enabling 
Whitlock to demand from Hilander not only the value of the property, 




Where, as in Whitlock and as in most SEP cases, it appears that the 
plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief merely as bargaining leverage,
106
 the 
injunction will generally be unavailable under the “traditional four-factor 
test” for permanent injunctive relief set out in eBay Inc. v. 
                                                          
concerns of potential patentee opportunism).   
 100.  Policy Statement, supra note 57, at 6–7. 
 101.  720 N.E.2d 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 102.  Id. at 303, 305. 
 103.  Id. at 306. 
 104.  Id. at 303–04. 
 105.  See id. at 307.  The wall cost $1.5 million to build.  Id.  
 106.  Id. at 303.  The trial court held that the balance of equities tipped strongly against an 
injunction, but the appellate court reversed for trial on whether Hilander acted intentionally when it 
built the retaining wall, in which case the courts would not balance the equities, and injunctive relief 
would be granted.  Id.  
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MercExchange, L.L.C.
107
  Thus the Federal Circuit recently declined to 
“create, as some amici urge, a separate rule or analytical framework for 
addressing injunctions for []RAND-committed patents,” emphasizing 
that “[t]he framework laid out by the Supreme Court in eBay . . . 
provides ample strength and flexibility for addressing the unique aspects 
of []RAND committed patents.”
108
  The eBay factors are: (1) irreparable 
injury; (2) inadequacy of legal remedies; (3) balance of the parties’ 
hardships; and (4) public interest.
109
 
a. Irreparable Harm/Inadequacy of the Legal Remedies 
The first and second factors of the eBay test reflect the same 
considerations: namely, whether money damages (or, in theory, some 
other legal remedy) will adequately compensate the patentee for any 
harm to its property interests.
110
  Above, I argue that a RAND-rate 
royalty places the patentee in its rightful position and, consequently, 
adequately compensates the patentee.
111
  This is similar to courts outside 
of the RAND context that have concluded that money damages are 




In Apple v. Motorola, Judge Posner opined that the RAND 
commitment resulted in adequate legal remedies: 
I don’t see how, given FRAND, I would be justified in enjoining Apple 
from infringing . . . unless Apple refuses to pay a royalty that meets the 
FRAND requirement.  By committing to license its patents on FRAND 
terms, Motorola committed to license the [patent] to anyone willing to 
                                                          
 107.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006). 
 108.  Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled by 
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 109.  eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
 110.  See, e.g., ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Bianco v. 
Globus Med., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00147-WCB, 2014 WL 1049067, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2014); 
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 n.11 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“The 
irreparable harm inquiry and remedy at law inquiry are essentially two sides of the same coin . . . .”). 
 111.  See supra Part III.A; see also Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 
998, 1006–07 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 112.  See, e.g., ActiveVideo, 694 F.3d at 1340.  Outside of the RAND context, courts often 
examine the patentee’s past licensing practices in evaluating requests for injunctive relief.  Id.  
Factors include (1) whether the patentee has been a willing licensor; (2) the identity of parties to 
whom past licenses were given; (3) market experience since the licenses were granted; and (4) the 
identity of the new infringer. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (citing Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).  The RAND 
commitment impacts all of these factors: the patentee must willingly license all comers, regardless of 
what has occurred in the market since prior licenses. 
2015] HOLDING STANDARDS FOR RANDSOME 207 
pay a FRAND royalty and thus implicitly acknowledged that a royalty 
is adequate compensation for a license to use that patent.
113
 
Thus, “[a] FRAND royalty would provide all the relief to which 
Motorola would be entitled if it proved infringement, . . . and thus it is 
not entitled to an injunction.”
114
 
On appeal in Apple v. Motorola, all three judges on the Federal 
Circuit panel wrote separately to address the matter of injunctive relief, 
but the court affirmed Judge Posner’s summary judgment rejecting 
Motorola’s injunction claim over a dissent from then-Chief Judge Rader.  
Judge Reyna, who wrote the opinion of the court, disagreed with Judge 
Posner’s analysis “[t]o the extent” that he “applied a per se rule that 
injunctions are unavailable for SEPs.”
115
  Judge Reyna hypothesized that 
“an injunction may be justified where an infringer unilaterally refuses a 
FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to the same 
effect.”
116
  “To be clear, this does not mean that an alleged infringer’s 




Judge Prost wrote separately because she thought Judge Reyna’s 
opinion left the door to injunctive relief open too widely—she disagreed 
with the “suggestion that an alleged infringer’s refusal to negotiate a 
license justifies the issuance of an injunction.”
118
  Judge Prost noted that 
a threat of injunctive relief for an SEP would deter implementers from 
raising even good-faith challenges about validity and infringement.
119
  
She thought that an implementer with a good-faith challenge to validity 
or noninfringement “should not necessarily be punished for less than 
                                                          
 113.  Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913–14 (N.D. Ill. 2012), rev’d in part, 
757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  Judge Posner also used the parties’ attempts to calculate damages 
against them in their request for an injunction: “And neither has acknowledged that damages for the 
infringement of its patents could not be estimated with tolerable certainty.  On the contrary, each 
insists not only that damages are calculable but that it has calculated them.”  Id. at 916.  In general, 
the fact that the plaintiff has calculated damages for past infringement does not mean that the 
damages are an adequate legal remedy for future infringement.  Our system provides for 
substitutionary relief to a patentee for infringement, not because monetary damages are easily 
calculated or even necessarily commensurable with the right to exclude, but because the right to 
exclude cannot be restored in-kind.  Thus, a patentee does not concede the adequacy of money 
damages merely by offering a calculation of damages for past infringement. 
 114.  Id. at 915.  
 115.  Apple, 757 F.3d at 1331.  It is not clear that Judge Posner ever articulated such a per se rule 
in his opinion. 
 116.  Id. at 1332. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 1342 (Prost, J., dissenting in part). 
 119.  See id. 
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eager negotiations.”
120
  Judge Prost would completely remove “a party’s 
pre-litigation conduct in license negotiations” from the determination of 
the patentee’s request for injunctive relief.
121
 
Judge Rader dissented on this point.  He agreed with Judge Reyna 
that injunctions should be available where the implementer refuses to 
negotiate for a license, but he added that the record was sufficient to go 
to trial on the question of whether Apple was an unwilling licensee.
122
  
He suggested that “Motorola should have had the opportunity to prove its 
case that Apple’s alleged unwillingness to license or even negotiate 




The implicit disagreement between Judge Prost and the other judges 
relates to whether the injunction should serve the protective interest only 
in the first way mentioned above (proscribing post-judgment 
infringement) or whether it should also serve the protective interest in the 
second way (coercing license negotiations by threatening to nullify an 
implementer’s sunk costs or even eliminate the implementer from the 
industry).  By arguing that pre-litigation conduct should not be 
considered, Judge Prost would limit injunctive relief to this first means of 
serving the protective interest.  The other judges, by suggesting that 
injunctive relief might be available against an implementer who 
unreasonably delays license negotiations, would allow injunctive relief to 
serve the protective interest in both capacities. 
While it is not surprising that the judges might disagree about this, it 
is odd for them to characterize the availability of injunctive relief in these 
cases as a function of the adequacy of the legal remedies.  The 
implementer’s pre-litigation conduct would not impact the adequacy of a 
RAND-rate post-litigation.  In other words, once the parties are in 
litigation, a RAND-rate royalty serves the restorative interest for any 
completed infringement equally well regardless of the implementer’s 
pre-litigation conduct; the point of the license-coercing aspect of the 
threat of injunctive relief is to incentivize future parties to negotiate 
toward a RAND-rate agreement without litigation.  Regardless of the 
implementer’s prelitigation conduct—whether the implementer engaged 
in good-faith negotiations or refused to negotiate altogether—the 
restorative ability of a damages award for past infringement remains 
unchanged.  Whether legal remedies are adequate for future infringement 
                                                          
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 1343. 
 122.  Id. at 1332–33 (Rader, J., dissenting in part). 
 123.  Id. at 1334.  
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cannot turn on an implementer’s past behavior.  Thus, it seems strange 
for Judge Posner to opine that a RAND commitment renders legal 




It is possible, however, for damages to be an inadequate remedy for 
infringement of RAND-encumbered patents.  As Judge Posner 
recognized, the infringer’s insolvency may render the legal remedy 
inadequate.
125
  This is not controversial—most courts agree that an 
uncollectible damages award would not be an adequate legal remedy.
126
  
In addition, legal remedies may be inadequate for ongoing future 
infringement because complete compensation would require multiple 
successive lawsuits, and most courts agree that the damages are 
inadequate for future wrongdoing where the plaintiff would have to file 
periodic lawsuits to recover those damages.
127
 
But none of this explains why Judges Posner, Reyna, and Rader 
would hinge the determination of the adequacy of legal remedies for 
future infringement on the implementer’s pre-lawsuit conduct.  It is hard 
to understand how their concern in such cases rests on the adequacy vel 
non of legal remedies.  More likely, their analysis simply hinges on the 
desire to coerce implementers to negotiate toward a RAND-rate license 
in good faith—that is, to supply the incentive necessary under the 
contract view to avoid implementer opportunism.  I argue below that this 
incentive would be better served by enhanced damages.
128
 
b. Balance of Harms 
The second eBay factor for injunctive relief is the balance of harms.  
Courts considering injunctive relief must balance the relative harms that 
would result to each party from the presence or absence of an injunction.  
In most cases of RAND-encumbered SEPs, we would expect the balance 
of harms to tip strongly against an injunction.
129
  In SEP cases, the 
                                                          
 124.  Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913–14 (N.D. Ill. 2012), rev’d in part, 
757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  Similarly, the Federal Circuit discussed potential injunctions 
against implementers who were unwilling to pay the RAND rate.  Apple, 757 F.3d at 1332. 
 125.  Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 916. 
 126.  DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 86–87 n.22 (1991). 
 127.  See, e.g., 42 AM. JUR. 2D INJUNCTIONS § 41; Hadley v. Dep’t of Corr., 840 N.E.2d 748, 
756 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 128.  See infra Part III.B.2.a. 
 129.  See Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 917 (“A related reason for withholding injunctive relief in 
this case is that it would be likely to impose costs on the alleged infringer disproportionate both to 
the benefits to it of having infringed and to the harm to the victim of infringement, and would thus 
be a windfall to the patentee and a form of punitive rather than compensatory damages imposed on 
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implementer’s need to use the patent is extremely high (compliance with 
the applicable standard turns on it), and, as discussed above,
130
 the harm 
to the patentee is more measurable than in the average patent case.
131
  
This is akin to Justice Kennedy’s observation in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C. that some non-practicing entities use “an 
injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its 
violation . . . as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies 
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”
132
 
But courts considering injunctive relief usually do not balance the 
parties’ respective hardships where the defendant’s wrongdoing was 
willful.
133
  Thus, this theory may explain what the courts mean when they 
say, as Judge Posner did, that injunctions might be appropriate where the 
implementer is unwilling to pay the RAND rate—the infringer in that 
case could not find shelter in a balance-of-harms analysis.
134
  This also 
might explain why some courts—including Judge Reyna’s majority 
opinion in Apple v. Motorola—have left open the possibility of an 
injunction for implementers who act in bad faith in response to the 
patentee’s licensing attempts.
135
  But, even if the court refuses to balance 
the harms because of the willfulness of the defendant’s wrongdoing, this 
does not undermine the earlier point that legal remedies will generally be 
adequate to compensate a RAND-committed patentee for infringement of 




                                                          
the infringer.”). 
 130.  See supra Part III.A. 
 131.  One important consideration in injunctive relief is whether courts can fix damages “without 
imposing an unacceptably high risk of undercompensation” on the plaintiff.  Anthony T. Kronman, 
Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 362 (1978).  And what constitutes an “unacceptably” 
high risk of undercompensation will be measured against the harm that an injunction would cause 
the opposing party.  See Van Wagner Adver. Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d 756, 760 (N.Y. 
1986). 
 132.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
Justice Kennedy related the use of an injunction threat as a bargaining chip to the adequacy of legal 
remedies and to the public interest:  
When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek 
to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement 
and an injunction may not serve the public interest.   
Id. at 396–97. 
 133.  James M. Fischer, What Hath eBay v. MercExchange Wrought?, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 555, 565 (2010). 
 134.  See id. 
 135.  See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled by 
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 136.  See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., 735 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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c. Public Interest 
The public interest includes considerations going both ways with 
respect to SEPs.
137
  Courts have often cited the public’s interest in 
preserving patent integrity (favoring injunctions).  The public also has a 
significant interest in the ability of SSOs to set workable and widely-
adopted standards—the FTC has recognized the pro-competitive nature 
of this and its public benefit
138
—and that ability could be hampered if 
injunctions were too readily available against standards implementers. 
Another public interest concern is the potential for patentee 
opportunism that injunctions impose.
139
  While probably few would 
quibble with awarding injunctive relief against those implementers who 
willfully infringe with no intention of negotiating in good faith toward a 
RAND license (that is, those who would not get the benefit of a balance 
of harms analysis), such a standard creates a risk that innocent infringers 
will be mistaken for willful infringers.  And, even if that is unlikely in 
practice, an implementer’s perception of that risk would lead the risk-
averse implementer to accept an above-RAND royalty rather than risk an 
injunction.  Thus, any standard for the award of injunctive relief in 
RAND cases must assure innocent implementers that they will not face 
the threat of injunction.  The standard that best fits that bill is the one that 
Judge Prost articulated in Apple v. Motorola: the removal of pre-
litigation conduct from the injunction analysis,
140
 leaving injunctions 
available only for post-litigation refusal to license. 
Injunctive relief in the limited situation in which an implementer 
refuses to license at a court-adjudicated RAND rate (or otherwise cannot 
pay the rate) would not detrimentally impact the ability of SSOs to attract 
implementers.  Implementers expect when they implement the standard 
to pay a RAND rate (as determined judicially if the parties cannot agree).  
And, certainly making injunctive relief available will not deter patentees 
from participating in SSOs—on the contrary, the absence of this relief 
                                                          
 137.  Apple, 757 F.3d at 1332 (“[T]he public has an interest in encouraging participation in 
standard-setting organizations but also in ensuring that SEPs are not overvalued.”). 
 138.  In re Certain Wireless Commc’n Devs., Portable Music & Data Processing Devs., 
Computs. & Components Thereof, ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-745, Third Party United States Fed. Trade 




 139.  See generally Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1007 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013) (“[T]he pending threat of an exclusion order gives defendants inherent bargaining power 
in any RAND licensing negotiation that may now take place.”). 
 140.  Apple, 757 F.3d at 1343 (Prost, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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might very well do so.  Thus, the public’s interest in thriving SSOs is not 
undercut by this very limited availability of injunctive relief.  The public 
might also have an interest in the continuation of the defendant’s 
business, as the district court held in eBay,
141
 and as courts have held in 
many medical device cases.
142
  But, this analysis will necessarily be case-
specific. 
d. Conclusion for Injunctive Relief 
Based on an analysis of these factors, we would generally expect 
injunctive relief to be unavailable in cases of standard-essential patents.  
The legal remedy of monetary damages will generally be adequate to 
compensate the patentee, who has already expressed a willingness to 
give up his right to exclude in exchange for monetary damages, and the 
balance of harms will tip strongly in favor of the implementer, at least in 
cases in which the harms are balanced.  Moreover, the public interest 
cautions against the availability of injunctive relief in most cases.  The 
availability of injunctions should be limited to those implementers who 
refuse to accept a license at a judicially determined RAND rate post-
litigation, so that the patentee would be forced to file multiple periodic 
lawsuits in order to recover for the ongoing infringement.  A corollary of 
this is that preliminary injunctions should be unavailable in SEP cases—
infringement that occurs during the litigation can be captured in the 
initial damages award.
143
  For other protective interest concerns, we can 
turn to the remedy of enhanced damages. 
2. Enhanced Damages 
A second remedy that can serve the protective interest is enhanced 
damages.  Under my analysis, injunctions can serve the first purpose of 
the protective interest in SEP cases—they can prevent post-litigation 
infringement by implementers who refuse to take a RAND license—but 
they cannot encourage infringers to negotiate in good faith for a RAND 
license pre-litigation if, as I suggest following Judge Prost’s lead, pre-
                                                          
 141.  MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 586–87 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 142.  Covidien Sales LLC v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-917 (JCH), 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 147060, at *36–37 (D. Conn. Oct. 15, 2014) (collecting cases). 
 143.  Because the patentee will not have the preliminary injunction as “an adequate remedy for 
combating post-filing willful infringement,” In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (en banc), enhanced damages for willful infringement during the litigation should be 
available to the patentee in appropriate cases.  The standard for enhanced damages in SEP cases is 
discussed infra, in Part III.B.2. 
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litigation conduct is removed from the injunction calculus.
144
  
Consequently, if this aspect of the protective interest is to be served in 
SEP cases, it must be through enhanced damages. Fortunately, enhanced 
damages are well-suited for this purpose. 
a. The Preference for Enhanced Damages over Injunctions 
The patent laws allow courts to award enhanced damages (up to 
treble damages) against parties who willfully infringe.
145
  Enhanced 
damages are not intended to restore the patentee’s rightful position—the 
patentee recovers more than necessary to make it whole
146
—but, like the 
threat of injunctions, the specter of enhanced damages can protect the 
patentee’s rightful position by incentivizing implementers to negotiate a 
license ex ante rather than to infringe valid patents.
147
 
Enhanced damages and injunctive relief can each incentivize would-
be infringers to negotiate for a license and, consequently, have generally 
been lumped together in discussions by courts and commentators.  But 
enhanced damages are preferable to injunctive relief to serve this second 
coercive aspect of the protective interest.  Remember that the primary 
concern behind injunctive relief—and the concern driving the waiver 
view and the implied license view—is the potential for patentee 
opportunism.  If even good-faith implementers feel that they could be 
                                                          
 144.  Judge Prost, in her partial dissent, emphasized this point noting that injunctions can 
“punish[]” implementers “for less than eager negotiations,” but that enhanced damages can serve this 
same purpose. Apple, 757 F.3d at 1342 (Prost, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 145.  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).  The Patent Act does not provide a standard for awarding 
enhanced damages—it simply permits the court to award damages up to three times compensatories.  
But judicial interpretations have long circumscribed the award to cases of willful infringement.  See 
Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368. 
 146.  This is not an entirely uncontroversial assertion.  See 7-20 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 
20.03(4)(b)(iii), at 20-192.  Part of the controversy stems from the absence of a scienter requirement 
in the patent statute.  Id.  But, as long as the “willfulness” requirement is judicially engrafted onto 
the statutory language, enhanced damages should be viewed as a punishment or deterrent.  See id. 
 147.  In addition, enhanced damages may fit under Professor Jimenez’s discussion of the 
retributive interest, to the extent it exists in private civil law.  See Jimenez, supra note 68, at 1338–
40.  To take the examples of the retributive interest cited by Professor Jimenez, see id., the infringer 
with a good-faith claim of non-infringement, invalidity, or with a genuine disagreement about the 
RAND rate, resembles the innocent trespasser in Beck v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018, 
1021 (10th Cir. 1999), where the defendant leased underground storage for natural gas, and some of 
the gas leaked onto plaintiff’s property.  The Tenth Circuit concluded that fair rental value reflected 
the proper measure of restitution.  Id. at 1024.  Compare this case with Edwards v. Lee’s 
Administrator, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1028–29 (Ky. 1936), where Edwards discovered the entrance to the 
Great Onyx Cave on his property and turned the cave into a tourist attraction.  Edwards knew that 
part of the tour included a portion of the cave under Lee’s land.  Id. at 1030.  The court awarded 
restitution not based on that portion of the cave’s fair rental value (the cave was inaccessible except 
through Edwards’s entrance), but the profits Edwards derived from exploiting the portion of the cave 
under Lee’s land.  Id. at 1032–33. 
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subject to an injunction, nullifying their investments in standard 
compliance and effectively driving them from the industry, good-faith 
but risk-averse implementers would end up accepting above-RAND 
licenses offered by opportunistic patentees.  For several reasons, 
enhanced damages carry a lower risk of this result than injunctions do. 
First, willfulness for enhanced damages must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence,
148
 but there is no comparable heightened standard 
for the level of proof necessary for determining willfulness in deciding 
whether to balance the equities for injunctive relief
149
—that is 
determined by a preponderance of the evidence.
150
  Second, enhanced 
damages are not binary; they can be awarded in any amount up to treble 
damages,
151
 depending in part on the certainty of the willfulness finding 
and the nature of the evidence.
152
  An injunction prohibiting the use of 
the patented invention, on the other hand, is either granted or denied—it 
is less obvious how it could be modified according to the particulars of 
the case.  More importantly, in the event that a willfulness determination 
is in error, enhanced damages, while certainly a blow to the 
implementer’s bottom line, do not effectively force the implementer out 
of the industry or allow the patentee to hold the implementer’s business 
hostage in the way that a prohibitory injunction would.
153
 
To the extent that enhanced damages and injunctive relief both serve 
the protective interest by encouraging good-faith license negotiations, 
there is no need to award them both, and enhanced damages are the 
preferable option.  But, if enhanced damages are to encourage good-faith 
negotiation in the SEP context, the willfulness standard must be set in a 
way that avoids potential opportunism by either party—it must not risk 
imposing liability on the good-faith implementer but it must retain 
sufficient teeth to incentivize the conduct of opportunistic implementers. 
                                                          
 148.  Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
 149.  See supra Part 3.B.1.b (explaining when the hardships to the parties are not balanced). 
 150.  Brandt v. Burwell, 43 F. Supp. 3d 462, 483 (W.D. Pa. 2014). 
 151.  Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 152.  See CHISUM, supra note 146, § 20.03(4)(b)(vi), at 20-460.110 nn.368.366–68, 20-460.136 
n.366.432 and accompanying text. 
 153.  Enhanced damages should nevertheless eliminate opportunistic conduct on the part of the 
implementer, at least as long as the specter of enhanced damages makes the risk of infringement 
outweigh the expected profit of infringement, the implementer has incentive to take a license.  At the 
very least, the threat of enhanced damages should cause the implementer to negotiate in good faith 
once it is approached by the patentee.  
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b. Knowledge of the Patent 
Willful infringement requires at least objective recklessness,
154
 
meaning that there must have been an “objectively high likelihood” both 
that the patent was valid and that the defendant’s actions infringed the 
patent.
155
  To be willful, the patent infringement must have been “either 
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused 
infringer.”
156
  This means that a willful infringer must have known about 
the patent at issue.
157
  Willfulness hinges on the totality of the 
circumstances, and no one factor is controlling.
158
 
With respect to the knowledge requirement, an implementer does not 
have sufficient knowledge of the patent merely because the patentee 
declared the patent to be standard-essential.  Although one might suggest 
that the implementer knows of the patent by virtue of the patentee’s 
declaration that the patent is an SEP, this suggestion would impose too 
high a burden on standard implementers.  More importantly, it is not the 
standard imposed by patent law, which requires actual notice rather than 
constructive notice.
159
  Some standards may contain thousands of 
declared-SEPs,
160
 and the SSO does not usually inquire into the validity 
of the patent or the patentee’s claims that its patent reads on the standard.  
For most SSOs, anyone can declare a patent to be an SEP, subject to 
agreeing to the RAND commitment, and questions about whether the 
patent is valid or infringed by standard implementation are left for later 
determination among implementers and patentees.
161
  And in some cases, 
patentees offer blanket assurances that they will license any SEPs in their 
                                                          
 154.  Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649, 660–61 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Seagate, 497 F.3d at 
1371. 
 155.  Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Deckers 
Outdoor Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“Actual 
knowledge—not constructive knowledge—is the criterion.”).   
 158.  Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1369. 
 159.  Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (a pre-Seagate case, holding that “[w]illful infringement in this case hinges on when 
the defendants had actual knowledge of Imonex’s patent rights, and their actions after that time”). 
 160.  See Lemley, supra note 3, at 151; see also Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 
1201, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The mere fact that thousands of patents are declared to be essential to 
a standard does not mean that a standard-compliant company will necessarily have to pay a royalty 
to each SEP holder.”). 
 161.  See Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting 
Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 683 (2007); Certain 
Wireless Devs. With 3G and/or 4G Capabilities and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-868, 
USITC at 111–12 (June 13, 2014). 
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entire patent portfolios at RAND rates,
162
 which does not place the 
implementers on notice with respect to any specific patent, particularly if 
the patentee’s portfolio is far-reaching. 
Thus, for a finding of willful infringement, it is not sufficient for the 
patentee to simply point to the SEP declaration and suggest that the 
implementer knew of the patent; the implementer must have some more 
specific notice of the patent that is claimed to be infringed.  But there is a 
related question: once the implementer has notice of the patent, what are 
the implementer’s obligations with respect to seeking a license?
163
 
c. The Implementer’s Recklessness 
Until 2008, the Federal Circuit had held that an infringer had a duty 
to exercise due care in avoiding infringement.
164
  In In re Seagate, the en 
banc Federal Circuit removed the presumption of willfulness that arose 
from an infringer’s failure to exercise due care to avoid infringement.
165
  
Now, willfulness turns primarily on whether the infringer was 
objectively reckless with respect to infringement.
166
  This means that “the 
infringer was aware of the asserted patent, but nonetheless ‘acted despite 
an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of 
a valid patent.’”
167
  The subjective prong of the Seagate inquiry means 
that “the infringer knew or should have known of this objectively high 
risk.”
168
  Infringement is likely to be willful if the implementer (1) has 
specific notice (beyond the SEP declaration) of the patent, including the 
applicability to the standard; (2) lacks a substantial basis for arguing non-
infringement; and (3) lacks a substantial basis for arguing invalidity or 
unenforceability.
169
  Again, there is little here that differs from a standard 
                                                          
 162.  Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Determining RAND Royalty Rates for Standard-
Essential Patents, 29-FALL ANTITRUST 86, 90 (2014). 
 163.  This question is related because it applies only when the implementer’s notice of the patent 
comes from a source other than direct notice from the patentee.  When the notice comes directly 
from the patentee, it will almost always be accompanied by a demand letter/licensing offer. 
 164.  In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 165.  See Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 166.  Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
 167.  i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  See, e.g., Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374 (noting that a substantial question about invalidity or 
noninfringement may avoid a charge of willfulness); Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool 
Corp., 260 F. App’x 284, 291 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (nonprecedential); see also Minks v. Polaris Indus., 
Inc., No. 6:05-cv-1894-Orl-31KRS, 2007 WL 788418, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, remanded in part, 546 F.3d 1364, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming award of enhanced 
damages on plain error review where infringer did not investigate infringement despite “several 
warning flags” that gave it notice of the infringement); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum 
Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 55 (2005). 
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patent case outside of the RAND context.  There is, however, a 
difference in the obligations of the parties once the implementer is 
alerted to the claimed infringement. 
In most cases, if the infringer continues to infringe after being 
alerted to the patent and to the claimed infringement, and if the infringer 
lacks any objectively reasonable defense, willfulness will be found.
170
  In 
fact, “[w]here a potential infringer unsuccessfully seeks a license from 
the patentee, the potential infringer may have a higher duty of due care to 
avoid infringement.”
171
  In other words, outside of the standard-essential 
patent context, if the infringer unsuccessfully attempts to procure a 
license to a valid patent that it infringes, it may well be subject to 
enhanced damages for any products it makes or sells thereafter.  But in 
the RAND context, the implementer knows that the patentee has 
committed to license the patent at a RAND rate, and it should not be 
forced to quit manufacturing or selling the standard-compliant product as 
the result of a good-faith disagreement as to the licensing rate.  Indeed, 
some have argued that the RAND commitment fulfills its purpose by 
enabling the parties to delay negotiation.
172
  If the implementer were 
forced to quit making or selling its product during the negotiation period, 
then the patentee could opportunistically compel an above-RAND 
license rate by intentionally protracting the negotiations.  Thus, 
willfulness should not be found where the implementer continues to 
make or sell the infringing products while it negotiates (or litigates) in 
good faith for a RAND-rate license.
173
  Similarly, if the patentee 
withdraws from the negotiations, the implementer remains free to 
continue manufacturing the infringing product without subjecting itself 
to enhanced damages, as long as the implementer demonstrated a 
                                                          
 170.  See sources cited supra note 169. 
 171.  ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., 4 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 31:20 (2005); Spindelfabrik 
Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 
829 F.2d 1075, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Schubert attempted unsuccessfully to obtain a license . . . 
[This] supports a conclusion that Schubert was explicitly aware of the possibility of infringement. 
Under those circumstances, Schubert must be held to a high degree of caution . . .”).  The language 
used here is that of the pre-Seagate standard. 
 172.  Lichtman, supra note 28, at 1041. 
 173.  There are two potential legal avenues by which to reach this conclusion.  The first is that 
willfulness “measures the infringing behavior . . . against an objective standard of reasonable 
commercial behavior in the same circumstances.”  Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 
F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  Because it is commercially reasonable for an implementer who 
knows of the patentee’s RAND-commitment to continue to produce its products under the RAND-
commitment assurances, the implementer’s conduct would not be willful.  But, even if the 
implementer’s conduct could be considered “willful infringement” under the Seagate standard, 
Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1360, enhanced damages do not follow inexorably from a willfulness finding, 
but instead rest on the totality of the circumstances, including the interests of justice and the 
infringer’s culpability.  See Matthews, supra note 171, at § 31:16. 
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willingness to engage in good faith negotiations.
174
 
In essence, and quite unlike ordinary patent infringement, good-faith 
licensing negotiations provide a safe harbor against enhanced damages in 
cases involving a RAND-encumbered SEP, even if those negotiations 
break down.  We can find a helpful analogue in the insurance context, in 
which mere failure to pay the amount due under the insurance contract 
will not subject the insurer to punitive damages—the insurer must refuse 
to pay in bad faith.
175
  In concluding that the standard of proof for a claim 
of bad faith should be by clear and convincing evidence, one court noted 
that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard would pressure insurers 
to forgo even good-faith defenses to payment out of fear of being stuck 
with punitive damages.
176
  Such a rule “would make claims 
nondisputable [and] would result in prohibitive social costs” by allowing 
opportunism on the part of the insured.
177
 
This same concern—the desire to promote license negotiations 
between the parties without threatening the good-faith implementer with 
enhanced damages if the negotiations fail—bespeaks caution in 
establishing the standard of willfulness applicable in the RAND context.  
Willfulness determinations, while possible in the context of a RAND-
encumbered SEP, should be more rare than in traditional patent 
litigation,
178
 because the RAND commitment creates an additional hurdle 
to a finding of willfulness.  Specifically, the implementer must, in 
addition to having knowledge of the patent and no objectively reasonable 
defenses, nevertheless act with the intent not to procure a RAND license.  
Judge Prost made a similar point in her partial dissent in Apple v. 
Motorola, in which she argued that, “if a trial court believes that an 
infringer previously engaged in bad faith negotiations, it is entitled to 
increase the damages.”
179
  Under this view, a good-faith disagreement 
                                                          
 174.  Alternatively, the implementer could sue the patentee for specific performance of its 
RAND obligations, as some implementers have done.  See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 
No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); Realtek Semiconductor 
Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 175.  See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 363 (Ind. 1982). 
 176.  Id.  
 177.  Id. (“A rule that would permit an award of punitive damages upon inferences permissibly 
drawn from evidence . . . which may be nothing more than a refusal to pay the amount demanded 
and subsequently found to be owing—injects such risks into refusing and defending against 
questionable claims as to render them, in essence, non-disputable.  The public interest cannot be 
served by any policy that deters resort to the courts for the determination of bona fide commercial 
disputes.”). 
 178.  Between August 2007 and July 2010, willfulness was found in approximately 37.2% of 
patent infringement cases that went to trial.  Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and 
Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 441 (2012). 
 179.  Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Prost, J., dissenting in 
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about the measure of RAND terms would preclude a finding of 




3. Mandatory Injunctions: Ongoing Royalties 
As discussed above, prohibitory injunctions serve the protective 
interest through the direct injunctive command—proscribing further 
injunction post-judgment—and through the threat of injunction that 
incentivizes infringers to seek a license.  The second method is also 
served by enhanced damages, which are preferable to injunctive relief in 
SEP cases.
181
  But there is also another remedy that can accomplish the 
first task of prohibiting post-judgment infringement.  This other remedy 
is the ongoing royalty—an order that essentially permits the infringer’s 
continued infringement of the patent, but orders the payment of a set 
royalty for each act of infringement.
182
 
a. Authority to Order an Ongoing Royalty 
The ongoing royalty is a relatively recent development in patent 
law,
183
 becoming prominent after the Supreme Court’s eBay decision and 
a district court’s 2006 decision in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.
184
  
Courts are usually unclear about the authority under which they award 
ongoing royalties.  Patent law provides for federal courts to “grant 
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the 
violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems 
reasonable,”
185
 language that the Federal Circuit has held restricts the 
                                                          
part), overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  Judge Prost 
stated that the trial judge could increase damages “to account for any harm to the patentee as a result 
of that behavior,” but the above analysis would permit enhanced damages, not necessarily to account 
for harm to the patentee, but to serve the protective interest.  Id. 
 180.  This does not mean that a refusal to negotiate is necessarily in bad faith.  For example, 
when the implementer seeks judicial recourse as to the RAND rate without negotiation because it 
reasonably believes that negotiation would be fruitless, the implementer is not likely acting in bad 
faith.  See Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *1–2 (in which Microsoft sued Motorola for breach of 
its RAND commitment without countering Motorola’s excessive initial offer). 
 181.  See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
 182.  Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 6687122, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2014). 
 183.  See Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (denying 
request for injunctive relief and ordering compulsory license). 
 184.  Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 185.  35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012). 
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“scope of activities that may be enjoined.”
186
  Although that court has 
insisted that ongoing royalties are awarded “in lieu of an injunction,”
187
 
the Federal Circuit has also indicated that an ongoing royalty is a form of 
injunction.
188
  In a decision remanding a case for the district court to 
determine an ongoing royalty, the Federal Circuit did not directly refer to 
the ongoing royalty as an injunction, but, in a footnote, it referred to 
“[a]n injunction delineating the terms of the compulsory license.”
189
  
Even though the Federal Circuit has avoided explicitly describing an 
ongoing royalty as injunctive,
190
 district courts have determined that the 




This conclusion raises an interesting issue, because courts that have 
awarded ongoing royalties have first almost uniformly denied prohibitory 
injunctions on the grounds that, among other things, the legal remedies 
are adequate.
192
  The finding of an adequate legal remedy should 
theoretically foreclose all injunctive relief under eBay,
193
 including the 
ongoing license.
194
  But, as discussed above, serial lawsuits are generally 
considered an inadequate legal remedy.
195
  Thus, it would seem that the 
real desideratum in these ongoing royalty cases is not the adequacy vel 
non of the legal remedy but is instead that the balance of harms and the 
public interest favor an ongoing royalty as opposed to a prohibitory 
injunction. 
                                                          
 186.  Paice, 504 F.3d at 1314. 
 187.  Id. at 1314–15. 
 188.  Id. (“The more difficult question . . . is whether an order permitting use of a patented 
invention in exchange for a royalty is properly characterized as preventing the violation of the rights 
secured by the patent.”). 
 189.  Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1381 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 190.  See Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315–16 (recognizing the ongoing royalty as an equitable remedy 
on which a jury trial is not required, but refraining from referring to the remedy as an injunction). 
 191.  Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., No. 2:11-CV-378-JRG, 2012 WL 1554645, at 
*6–7 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2012).  
 192.  See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at 
*5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (denying injunction), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293 
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 639 (E.D. Tex. 2009) 
(granting ongoing royalty); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. BMW N. Am., LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 
896 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (noting denial of injunctive relief and granting ongoing royalty); Creative 
Internet Adver. Corp. v. Yahoo! Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 847, 852 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (concluding that 
patent has an adequate legal remedy, and then awarding ongoing royalty). 
 193.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006). 
 194.  But see Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 
6687122, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2014) (“Samsung cites no cases that apply the four-factor 
permanent injunction test to ongoing royalties.  Indeed, it is unclear how the Court could apply the 
second eBay factor—‘that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury’—to an award of ongoing royalties.”). 
 195.  See supra note 131.  
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b. Determining an Ongoing Royalty in SEP Cases 
An ongoing royalty will be unnecessary in most RAND-encumbered 
SEP cases because the implementer will likely take a license once the 
RAND rate is judicially determined, and the patentee will likely grant a 
license.  If the implementer refuses to take a license once the RAND rate 
has been determined, there is no obvious reason not to grant prohibitory 
injunctive relief instead of choosing to award an ongoing royalty.  But 
the ongoing royalty can nevertheless provide an alternative to a 
prohibitory injunction, and it may prove particularly useful in a few 
specific situations.  First, courts may order an ongoing royalty when the 
patentee refuses to accept a license at the judicially determined RAND 
rate—this would, in essence, use an ongoing royalty as a form of 
compulsory license.
196
  The ongoing royalty would also prove useful in 
cases in which the implementer wants to appeal the calculation of the 
RAND rate, and the patentee refuses to enter into a license agreement 
that preserves the implementer’s right to appeal.
197
  In that situation, the 
court may consider an ongoing royalty so that the implementer is not 
excluded during appeal and the patentee does not have to initiate a later 
suit to collect the royalties.
198
  Finally, an ongoing royalty could 
potentially prove useful if the parties are unable to reach an agreement, 
even post-judgment, with regard to other license terms besides the 
royalty rate, such as cross-licensing terms, forum-selection clauses, or 
the like. 
Outside of the SEP context, ongoing royalties are sometimes 
awarded at a higher rate than the “reasonable royalties” that were 
awarded as damages in the litigation
199
 in part because the continuing 
post-verdict infringement is necessarily willful;
200
 in part because the 
patentee is forced to give up its right to exclude against its will;
201
 and in 
                                                          
 196.  This could be done through a claim for specific performance of the RAND commitment, 
discussed infra Part IV.C.  Alternatively, the patentee’s refusal to enter into such a license could be 
considered a breach of its RAND commitment, the damages of which would encompass any 
litigation fees expended by the implementer in future infringement litigation filed by the patentee. 
 197.  See, e.g., Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1004–05 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013). 
 198.  If the implementer is insolvent or otherwise unable to pay the ongoing royalty, the patentee 
should be able to obtain a prohibitory injunction, because an ongoing royalty would leave the 
patentee short of its rightful position. 
 199.  Creative Internet Adver. Corp. v. Yahoo! Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 847, 861 (E.D. Tex. 2009); 
Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. Chimei InnoLux Corp., 822 F. Supp. 2d 639, 652–53 (E.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d 
sub nom., 530 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. BMW N. Am., LLC, 
783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 903–04 (E.D. Tex. 2011). 
 200.  Mondis, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 649; Affinity Labs, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 899. 
 201.  Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (“[T]he 
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part because the parties’ bargaining positions and circumstances may 
have changed.
202
  Whatever the merits of that solution in other cases, 
those rationales are wholly unpersuasive in RAND cases.  By entering 
into a RAND commitment, the patentee has already voluntarily 
relinquished its right to exclude, and the ongoing royalty merely enforces 
the patentee’s RAND obligation.  Relatedly, it is difficult to describe the 
continuing use of the patent as willful infringement if the implementer 
pays the RAND rate—the very rate at which the patentee is obligated to 
license the patent if it were upholding its RAND obligations.  And, while 
changes in bargaining positions may affect royalty calculation outside of 
the RAND context,
203
 those changes should not affect the RAND rate, 
which, as discussed below, should almost always be calculated as of a 
time prior to the incorporation of the patent into the standard.
204
 
Another common rationale for a heightened ongoing royalty rate is 
that the ongoing royalty “has a significant impact on [the patentee’s] 
ability to license its technology to others and effectively precludes an 
exclusive licensing arrangement.”
205
  This too is a non-issue in a RAND 
case because the RAND commitment itself precludes exclusive 
licensing, and an additional compulsory license leaves unchanged the 
patentee’s ability (and obligation) to license its technology to others.  As 
the Paice court said in determining an ongoing royalty rate, the question 
                                                          
question instead becomes: what amount of money would reasonably compensate a patentee for 
giving up his right to exclude yet allow an ongoing willful infringer to make a reasonable profit?”). 
 202.  ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 6687122, at *15 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 25, 2014). 
 203.  Outside of the RAND context, the reasonable royalty does not necessarily include “changes 
in the market between the date of the hypothetical negotiation and the date of trial,” but the ongoing 
royalty is calculated based on all of the facts known at the time of its calculation.  Affinity Labs, 783 
F. Supp. 2d at 898 n.6; see Mondis, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 647, (“[T]he Court focuses on any new 
evidence that was not before the jury and additionally any changed circumstances . . . between a 
hypothetical negotiation that occurred in 2005 (which the jury determined) and a hypothetical 
negotiation that would occur in 2011 after the judgment (which this Court is determining).”). 
 204.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 205.  Paice, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 630.  Another oft-cited reason for a heightened ongoing royalty is 
the “parties’ changed legal status”—that the patent has been adjudicated valid and infringed.  Id. at 
628.  But this reasoning seems insufficient, because validity and infringement are assumed in 
calculating the reasonable royalty.  See Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion Over Ongoing 
Royalties, 76 MO. L. REV. 695, 704–05 (2011).  Perhaps this simply reflects the courts’ beliefs that, 
despite this formal requirement for the reasonable royalty calculation, factfinders nevertheless 
impose a patent strength discount.  Indeed, such a discount might be all but inevitable.  Existing 
licenses are considered the best evidence of a reasonable royalty, but existing licenses—whether 
procured under the threat of litigation or not—will reflect a discount for the parties’ assessment of 
patent strength (that is, validity and infringement).  See Layne S. Keele, Res”Q”ing Patent 
Infringement Damages After ResQNet: The Dangers of Litigation Licenses as Evidence of a 
Reasonable Royalty, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 181, 205–07 (2012). 
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is “what amount of money would reasonably compensate a patentee for 
giving up his right to exclude.”
206
  In the case of a RAND-encumbered 
SEP, we know that the patentee has already expressed a willingness to 
give up its right to exclude in exchange for a RAND royalty and, by the 
time the court considers whether to award an ongoing royalty, it will 
have already determined the RAND rate.
207
  Thus, the answer to the 
Paice court’s question in such cases is, “the judicially determined RAND 
rate.”  But that raises a separate question: How should a court determine 
the RAND rate? 
IV. OTHER ISSUES REGARDING RAND OBLIGATIONS 
The above discussion suggests that damages awards at the RAND 
rate will restore the patentee to its rightful position.
208
  But determining 
the kind of remedy appropriate in these cases is only the first step.  The 
second step is determining how to properly calculate a RAND royalty. 
A. Judicial Determination of the RAND Rate 
The reasonable royalty is typically calculated using the Georgia-
Pacific factors—a list of fifteen factors, of which the most important is 
the royalty that would have been agreed upon if the patentee and 
infringer had negotiated a royalty.
209
  The reasonable royalty calculation 
in its most common form undertakes a hypothetical negotiation between 
the patentee and infringer immediately before the infringing conduct 
began.
210
  Courts tasked with determining a RAND rate have also used 




Only a few courts so far have discussed the RAND rate 
                                                          
 206.  Paice, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 624. 
 207.  The RAND rate will be a question of fact for the jury, unless the parties waive the right to a 
jury determination.  See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11C9308, 2013 WL 
5593609, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).  Because the ongoing royalty is equitable, it will be set by 
the court.  Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 208.  See supra Part III.A. 
 209.  Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).  Judge 
Posner poked fun at the “non-exhaustive” fifteen factor list from Georgia-Pacific.  Apple, Inc. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 910–11 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and 
remanded, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 210.  Keele, supra note 205, at 187–88. 
 211.  See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Microsoft 
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *16–20 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 
2013); Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *5–6. 
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determination in depth.
212
  This is a difficult task, as demonstrated by 
Judge Robart’s 207-page opinion in Microsoft v. Motorola,
213
 later 
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.
214
  Most of the time, determination of the 
RAND rate will be a question for the jury,
215
 although the parties agreed 




  In Microsoft, Judge 
Robart recognized that an actual negotiation might produce non-
monetary consideration, such as cross-licenses, but he looked only to 
monetary compensation in determining a RAND.
218
 
Judge Robart outlined some “basic principles” for assessing RAND 
terms.  The methodology adopted should mitigate patent holdup risks 
and royalty stacking risks, and it should award “the economic value of 
[the] patented technology itself, apart from the value associated with 
incorporation of the patented technology into the standard.”
219
  The 
Federal Circuit recently echoed that sentiment, noting, “[j]ust as we 
apportion damages for a patent that covers a small part of a device, we 
must also apportion damages for SEPs that cover only a small part of a 
standard.”
220
  Judge Robart rejected Microsoft’s proposed approach, 
which would have determined the RAND rate by “calculating the 
incremental value of the technology compared to the alternatives that 
could have been written into the standard.”
221
  Instead, he adopted a 
modified reasonable royalty approach involving a hypothetical 
negotiation between the patentee and implementer, with the negotiation 
taking place prior to the standard’s adoption.
222
  Of course, the 
incremental value of the technology compared with available alternatives 
would tightly constrain the amount that would be agreed to by the 
negotiating parties, so that the incremental value of the patent is a key 
                                                          
 212.  Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1229 (“To our knowledge, only three other courts have considered 
the issue of appropriate RAND royalty rates—all district courts.”). 
 213.  See Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *101. 
 214.  Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 215.  See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1225. 
 216.  Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 4827743, at *4 (W.D. 
Wash. Oct. 10, 2012). 
 217.  Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *2. 
 218.  Judge Robart had no need to look at non-monetary consideration, because the pleadings 
sought only monetary consideration.  Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *3 n.3. 
 219.  Id. at *12. 
 220.  Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232–33. 
 221.  Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *13.  He rejected this approach in part because it would 
be difficult to determine in some cases where alternative technology would have required a much 
different standard, which may or may not be able to accomplish the same end result.  Id. 
 222.  Id. at *18–19.  The Federal Circuit recently declined to comment on “whether shifting the 
timing of the hypothetical negotiation is either appropriate or necessary” in RAND cases.  Ericsson, 
773 F.3d at 1239 n.10.  See also Michel, supra note 33, at 904 (arguing that the hypothetical 
negotiation should occur “when the decision to use the technology [in the standard] was made”). 
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consideration of the hypothetical negotiators.
223
  For this reason, the 
Federal Circuit has held that, particularly in the SEP context, “the patent 
holder should only be compensated for the approximate incremental 
benefit derived from his invention.”
224
 
This does not mean that the RAND royalty will necessarily be 
capped by the incremental value provided by the patented technology 
over the next-best alternative. This is so because the alternatives may 
have costs as well.  For example, imagine that Patent X’s technology can 
transcode video with a 3-second delay, and Patent Y (the alternative 
considered by the SSO) can transcode video with a 5-second delay, and 
software in the public domain can transcode video with a 15-second 
delay.  If we imagine that the value of transcoding video in 3 seconds 
instead of 5 seconds is $1, this does not mean that the value of Patent X 
in the standard is $1, because, absent Patent X, the SSO would have had 
to either use the public domain software (with a 15-second delay) or 
incorporate Patent Y at some cost—let’s say $1.50.  Thus, the 
incremental value added by Patent X is the difference between 3-second 
transcoding and 15-second transcoding, or the difference between 3-
second transcoding and 5-second transcoding ($1) plus the value of 
Patent Y over the public domain software ($1.50 in this example, for a 
total of $2.50). 
Judge Robart set out the factors that should influence the 
hypothetical negotiation.  He started with the Georgia-Pacific factors 
used to calculate a reasonable royalty in patent infringement cases.
225
  As 
Judge Robart and the Federal Circuit have recognized, some of those 
factors, such as the licensor’s desire to maintain its patent monopoly or 
antipathy toward licensing a competitor, would not apply in the RAND 
context, where the patentee has committed to license all comers without 
discriminating.
226
  With respect to the remaining factors, Judge Robart 
noted the importance of identifying the value added to the implementer’s 
products by the patented technology rather than the value resulting from 
the implementer’s use of the standard.
227
 
With regard to the twelfth factor—the typical royalty for this 
invention or comparable inventions—Judge Robart said that only 
                                                          
 223.  Indeed, one of the Georgia-Pacific factors (factor 9) relates to determining a reasonable 
royalty relates to the advantages of the patented invention over other available technology.  
Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *92. 
 224.  Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1233. 
 225.  Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *17. 
 226.  Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1230–31; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *18. 
 227.  Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *18. 
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RAND-committed licenses would matter; “licensing fees for non-RAND 
committed patents customary in a business industry cannot form the 
basis for comparison.”
228
  But it is not obvious why this should be so. 
Again, the primary concern driving RAND obligations is to avoid post-
standard patent holdup in which the patentee insists on recovering some 
of the value of the standard.  But a license agreement for a non-standard-
essential patent covering similar technology would not incorporate any 
value derived from standardization, and thus would seem to be probative 
evidence of a RAND license.
229
  Although such a license might be an 




Georgia-Pacific factor fifteen is the most important—it is the basis 
of the hypothetical negotiation and asks what amount a willing licensor 
and licensee would have agreed upon at the time the infringement began.  
In this case, Judge Robart said that the parties would “consider the 
RAND commitment and its purposes,” and “[i]n trying to reach an 
agreement, the SEP owner would have been obligated to license its SEPs 
on RAND terms, which necessarily must abide by the purpose of the 
RAND commitment of widespread adoption of the standard through 
avoidance of holdup and stacking.”
231
  (Royalty stacking involves 
worries that, if the standard incorporates many patents, the price of 
standard compliance may be too high.
232
)  Judge Robart said that, to 
address stacking concerns, the parties would consider “other SEP holders 
and the royalty rate that each of these patent holders might seek from the 
implementer based [on] the importance of these other patents to the 
standard and to the implementer’s products.”
233
 
There is no indication in the Microsoft opinion that royalty stacking 
had occurred with the standards involved, and, consequently, it was 
likely not appropriate for the court to use stacking concerns to effectively 
                                                          
 228.  Id. at *19; see also In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11C9308, 2013 WL 
5593609, at *33 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (“[T]here is no evidence that the Symbol–Proxim jury 
verdict was based on RAND considerations.”); id. at *36 (“The court does not take a position on the 
question of whether non–RAND licenses can ever be useful in determining a RAND rate.”). 
 229.  Unless, of course, the patent was part of the standard, but the patentee had managed to 
avoid encumbering its patent with a RAND commitment.  In that case, the license will include 
exactly what the RAND-rate seeks to exclude: standardization value. 
 230.  Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1227 (“Prior licenses . . . are almost never perfectly analogous to the 
infringement action.”); see also Keele, supra note 205, at 204–06. 
 231.  Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *20. 
 232.  Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *9. 
 233.  Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *86.  In other words, Judge Robart’s methodology 
appears to require a RAND license evaluation for all SEPs. 
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cap the RAND rate.
234
  The Federal Circuit recently held that a jury 
considering a reasonable royalty in a RAND case should not be 
instructed about royalty-stacking concerns unless there is “evidence on 
the record of . . . royalty stacking in relation to both the RAND 
commitment at issue and the specific technology referenced therein.”
235
  
The Innovatio court considered royalty stacking in a more limited way 
than Judge Robart—only as a check to ensure “that the asserted patents 
are not overvalued compared to the technological contribution they make 
to the standard.”
236
  This seems sensible because, just as standard 
incorporation should not increase the royalty paid over the value of the 
patented technology (meaning that patentees should not be able to 
command a higher price through patent holdup), it should not generally 
decrease the royalty below that value.  As Judge Robart acknowledged in 
Microsoft, the RAND rate should hinge “on the economic value of [the] 
patented technology itself, apart from the value associated with 
incorporation of the patented technology into the standard.”
237
 
Judge Robart then described the standards (802.11 and H.264) and 
patents at issue.  After examining the patents and their role in the 
standards, Judge Robart looked to the importance of the patents to the 
implementer (in this case, Microsoft).  In determining a RAND rate, 
Judge Robart properly ignored evidence about the value of standard 
compliance to Microsoft.
238
  He also suggested that, even though the 
SSO’s intellectual property rights policies may include patents that are 
essential to optional parts of the standard within the definition of SEPs, 




After examining the importance of each of Motorola’s patents to the 
standards at issue (that is, their value over other available technology at 
the time the standards were adopted) and the importance of each of 
Motorola’s patents to Microsoft (that is, the prevalence of Microsoft’s 
use of the patented systems or processes in various Microsoft products), 
Judge Robart looked to other licenses of the patents in suit and of other 
SEPs for assistance in determining the RAND rate.  Using these other 
licenses as comparables, Judge Robart set a RAND royalty rate. 
                                                          
 234.  See id. at *100 (opining that “stacking concerns from the perspective of the implementer 
govern the upper bound of RAND”). 
 235.  Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1234–35. 
 236.  Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *10.  Judge Robart later applied a similar analysis.  
Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *73. 
 237.  Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12. 
 238.  Id. at *44 (describing testimony). 
 239.  Id. at *51. 
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Some patentees with SEPs had created patent pools to license their 
patents to implementers of the standards in question, and Judge Robart 
relied heavily on these pools in determining the RAND rate.
240
  He 
looked at various rates discussed in setting patent pool rates and 
apportioned those rates to Motorola based on its patent portfolio.  He 
used the pool rates as the best indicator because Motorola had not shown 
that its patents were more valuable than the average patent in the pool, 
and his own analysis of the patents at issue indicated that the patents 
provided little value to the standard and to Microsoft.
241
 
One aspect of Judge Robart’s method of using the patent pools 
appears to have inflated the royalty amounts that he assigned.  He 
concluded that pool membership had value outside of the royalties 
received—value from “having full access to the immense technology 
included in the MPEG LA H.264 patent pool”—because Microsoft paid 
into the pool twice as much as it received from the pool.
242
  He 
determined that “Microsoft views membership in the MPEG LA H.264 
patent pool as providing a value of at least twice as much as it receives in 
royalty rates,” and he figured the RAND rate by tripling his calculation 
of what Motorola would have received had it joined the pool.
243
  The 
reasoning for this conclusion is unclear.  Presumably, Microsoft pays 
into the pool to license the patents of other pool members.
244
  This is not 
a function of membership in the pool, but of paying for patent licenses to 
use the standard—something that members and non-members alike will 
do.  The amount that the member pays into the pool is not a benefit of 
membership in the pool but is, instead, the cost of licensing other pool 
members’ patents.
245
  If Judge Robart’s initial determination was correct 
                                                          
 240.  Id. at *82–86. 
 241.  Id. at *85–86. 
 242.  Id. at *84. 
 243.  Id. at *84–85, 100. 
 244.  See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1043 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Typically, 
pool members contributing their patents to the pool also become licensees of the pool’s patent 
package.”). 
 245.  Consider it this way.  If Motorola had joined the pool, it would have received a royalty (as 
Judge Robart found) of 0.185 cents per unit.  It might have paid some amount (twice that, perhaps, 
although we don’t know) into the pool in order to join the pool and to license the other technology in 
the pool for its own products.  But, if it is going to implement the standard, it has to license that 
technology, and it can do so by paying the pool whether it is a pool member or not.  If pool members 
get a discount on the licensing rate from the rate paid by non-members, that discount would be a 
benefit of membership in the pool.  But it does not follow from the fact that Microsoft paid into the 
pool approximately twice what it received from the pool in royalties that pool membership is worth a 
total of three times the royalty received from the pool, so that the royalty rate Motorola would have 
received from the pool should be tripled.  As the Ninth Circuit noted in rejecting Motorola’s 
complaint on this issue, however, Judge Robart’s conclusion regarding the pool licenses was 
favorable to Motorola.  See id. at 1043. 
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that the pool royalty rate serves as a general indicator of a RAND-rate 
(and there is no reason to think that it could not, subject to tweaking for 
individuation according to the particular patents at issue), Judge Robart 
was right to examine the full value received from the pool by pool 
members, if any, in addition to the cash value of the royalties received.
246
  
But it is not clear that payments into the pool quantify benefits of pool 
membership, as opposed to merely reflecting payments for licensing the 
pool patents. 
The key question in a RAND calculation is the value of the patented 
technology, and in general damages contexts, courts determine value by 
asking what price would be agreed to by a willing buyer and seller.
247
  
Thus, on the whole, it makes sense to determine the RAND rate with 
reference to a hypothetical negotiation incorporated from the reasonable 




B. The Impact of Litigation Risk on the RAND Rate 
I argue above that enhanced damages should be available in rare 
cases against implementers who infringe RAND-encumbered SEPs in 
order to incentivize implementers to negotiate in good faith.
249
  But there 
is another point, relevant to the remedial interests, that impacts the 
parties’ incentives to negotiate toward a license: the RAND royalty 
calculated in litigation should be higher than a pre-litigation RAND 
royalty, at least where the court’s calculation follows a determination 
that the patent is valid and infringed, because pre-litigation negotiations 
take place amid litigation risk.
250
  This is true outside of the SEP context 
as well; in the hypothetical negotiation between the patentee and 
infringer that occurs immediately prior to the start of infringement, the 
parties presume the patent is valid, enforceable, and infringed.
251
  In 
other words, the hypothetical negotiation does not include a litigation-
risk discount. 
                                                          
 246.  See id. 
 247.  Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alon USA L.P., 705 F.3d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 248.  See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 249.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 250.  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11C9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (“Nonetheless, by the time the damages phase of an infringement suit arrives, 
the court has determined infringement and validity, thus foreclosing the hypothetical negotiator from 
benefiting from any uncertainty as to future court rulings.”); see also Realtek Semiconductor Corp. 
v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-03451-RMW, 2014 WL 46997, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2014). 
 251.  IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (E.D. Tex. 2010). 
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Unlike the hypothetical negotiation, real-world pre-litigation 
negotiations occur amid litigation risk.  Because of this, the implementer 
should be able to license the patent pre-litigation for less than what the 
court would determine to be the RAND rate after it has found 
infringement and validity.
252
  Thus, the risk-averse implementer would 
have some incentive to negotiate for a license pre-litigation.  But 
litigation risk has an even greater impact on the patentee’s negotiating 
position than it does on the implementer’s because of the unilateral 
nature of non-mutual collateral estoppel.  If the patent is held invalid, the 
patent becomes unenforceable against any future standards 
implementers,
253
 whereas, if the patent is determined to be valid against 
one implementer, any future standards implementers may nevertheless 
challenge the validity of the patent.
254
  Consequently, the patentee must 
multiply the downside risk of an invalidity determination over the total 
number of implementers, but it does not get the equivalent upside from a 
validity determination. 
Imagine, for example, that both parties estimate a 90% chance of 
patent validity, and that the RAND rate amounts to $100,000.  Leaving 
the probability of infringement and expected attorneys’ fees to the side, 
the infringer should settle for $90,000 or less.  But the infringer can insist 
on much less because of the patentee’s litigation risk.  Assume the 
patentee expects to enforce the patent against another implementer later.  
In calculating its expected value from litigation, the patentee must 
include the chance that an invalidity determination will eliminate 
enforcement against the second implementer.  The patentee’s expected 
value includes a 90% chance of $100,000 (from this litigation) plus an 
81% of another $100,000 (from the second implementer),
255
 for a total 
expected value of $171,000.  If he settles this litigation, he eliminates 
one of the opportunities for invalidity, and his chances of getting the 
$100,000 in the second litigation increase to 90%.  This means that he 
should settle the first case for $81,000 or more, because his expected 
value from both cases would then equal or exceed his expected value 
                                                          
 252.  Michel, supra note 33, at 908 (discussing impact of litigation risk on the ongoing royalty 
rate). 
 253.  Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
 254.  Cf. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2163 (2013) (discussing, in the context of patent trolls, the desire to settle 
early rather than risk an invalidity determination). 
 255.  The second litigation’s expected value is the product of the probable RAND rate award 
($100,000) and the odds that the patentee will be able to enforce that patent (0.9 x 0.9, because there 
are two opportunities for the patent to be held invalid).  For purposes of the illustration, I am treating 
the odds of an invalidity finding as fixed across all suits at 0.9—in reality, those odds might change. 
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from litigation of both cases ($171,000).  If the patentee expects to 
enforce the patent against three implementers, his expected value from 
litigation is $244,000,
256
 and he should settle the first case for anything 
more than $72,900.
257
  If the patentee hopes to sue a total of ten 
implementers, he will settle the first litigation for $34,867.85 rather than 
risk an invalidity determination.
258
 
The patentee’s settlement calculus must account for the litigation risk 
not only with respect to the implementer involved in this case, but also 
with respect to all potential implementers against whom it hopes to 
enforce the patent.  This may make only a small difference in many 
patent cases, where the patentee may not expect to enforce the patent 
against many parties, but, in SEP cases, the patentee expects there to be 
many standard implementers.  Consequently, we would expect 
negotiated settlements to fall well below the RAND rate—yet another 




C. Specific Performance of the Patentee’s RAND Commitment 
Where a patentee breaches its RAND commitment by refusing to 
negotiate toward a RAND-rate license,
260
 an implementer may have 
several remedies.  One such remedy might be a breach of contract suit, at 
least where the patentee refuses to negotiate toward a RAND license in 
good faith and instead seeks injunctive relief against the implementer.
261
  
                                                          
 256.  This is the sum of the expected value of the first litigation ($90,000), the expected value of 
the second litigation ($81,000), and the expected value of the third litigation ($72,900). 
 257.  If the patentee settles the first case, his odds of recovering in the second and third cases 
increase to 90% and 81%, respectively.  
 258.  The settlement value for a given case in these circumstances is 0.9 to the power of the 
number of expected lawsuits multiplied by the likely RAND rate.  Thus, if the patentee expects ten 
infringers, the settlement value of the first case is 0.9^10 * $100,000, or $34,867.85. 
 259.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text (commentators arguing against availability of 
enhanced damages); supra Part III.B.2 (explaining the role of enhanced damages in serving the 
protective interest). 
 260.  Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(holding that patentee breached RAND commitment by seeking injunctive relief without first 
offering a license); but see Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 11-CV-178-BBC, 2012 WL 
5943791, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 28, 2012) (concluding that patentee did not breach RAND 
commitment by requesting injunctive relief). 
 261.  In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 6000017, at *1–2 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 12, 2013), aff’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015), Microsoft claimed that Motorola 
breached its RAND commitment by, among other things, negotiating in bad faith before seeking 
injunctive relief against Microsoft.  Microsoft recovered as damages from Motorola the attorneys’ 
fees it expended in contesting Motorola’s injunction actions.  Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 
F.3d 1024, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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Or an implementer might seek specific performance—a court ordered 
license at a RAND rate, calculated to include a litigation risk discount 
(because, in a specific-performance setting, the calculation takes place 
without a determination of validity and infringement).
262
  Alternatively, 
we might say that the implementer does not need a license—it can 
simply wait for the patentee to sue, and then use the RAND commitment 
to limit the patentee’s damages.  But specific performance may be 
valuable to the implementer for several reasons.  First, under the RAND 
commitment, the implementer is entitled to avoid the litigation risks by 
taking a RAND license, and leaving the implementer with the specter of 
litigation hanging over it and its attendant risks threatens its ability to 
operate going forward.  Second, as explained above, the RAND rate 
should be calculated differently after a determination of infringement and 
validity, so that specific performance may be more valuable to the 
implementer than awaiting a determination of infringement damages.  In 
addition, the suit for specific performance would insulate the 
implementer from enhanced damages concerns. 
Some patentees have argued that the RAND commitment is too 
vague to be specifically enforced.
263
  The courts, however, have rejected 
that argument.
264
  If the RAND commitment is enforceable, a court must 
be able to determine the RAND rate.
265
  And, once we acknowledge that 
courts are capable of determining the RAND rate, specific performance 
                                                          
 262.  In Microsoft, the court simply incorporated uncertainty in the RAND range calculation, 
acknowledging that, where the patentee and the implementer had different reasonable views of 
infringement, these different views would lead to a different RAND rate calculation.  See, e.g., 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *60 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 
25, 2013).  To the extent that the judge discounted the RAND rate for patent strength uncertainty, 
that rate should not later be used for any damages award on an infringement claim because the 
RAND rate awarded for infringement should not reflect a litigation risk discount.  See supra Part 
IV.A.  Also, Judge Robart appeared skeptical about the validity of one of the patents at issue.  
Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *32 (“Moreover, Microsoft presented convincing evidence that the 
‘980 Patent disclosed prediction of motion using the same three blocks that the prior art used for 
progressive video. . . . Accordingly, the court concludes that it would have been intuitive for a 
person of ordinary skill to use the same blocks for interlaced video that were already known to work 
for progressive video.” (citations omitted)). 
 263.  See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-CV-178-BBC, 2011 WL 7324582, 
at *9 (W.D. Wis. June 7, 2011). 
 264.  See, e.g., ESS Tech., Inc. v. PC-Tel, Inc., No. C-99-20292-RMW, 1999 WL 33520483, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1999) (“[T]he court could easily determine what a fair and non-discriminatory 
contract would be.”); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-CV-178-BBC, 2012 WL 
5416941, at *3–4 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012) (“I conclude that specific performance may be an 
appropriate remedy under the circumstances of this case. In fact, it may be the only appropriate 
remedy.”). 
 265.  See Realtek Semiconductor, Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-3451-RMW, 2014 WL 2738226, 
at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2014) (declaring RAND commitment obligations after a jury determination 
of the RAND rate). 
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is easily implemented, at least where the RAND commitment does not 
include significant exceptions or caveats.  Earlier cases in the sales 
context—generally cases in which one party had an option to purchase or 
lease property at a “reasonable” price—offer precedent for specific 
performance in reasonable-price cases.
266
 
Courts have, however, rejected complaints by implementers who 
seek specific performance or a RAND declaration where the 
implementer refuses to commit to take a license at the declared rate.
267
  
In such a case, it appears that the implementer intends to use the rate as a 
ceiling from which to bargain downward, rather than to use it to get that 
to which the implementer is entitled (that is, a RAND-rate license).  
Courts tend to avoid serving as pawns in negotiating leverage, and the 
refusal to issue a declaratory judgment or specific performance in a case 
like this is almost certainly a reasonable exercise of their discretion.  If 
courts choose to declare the RAND rate and the implementer refuses to 
commit to a license, then both injunctive relief and enhanced damages 




The RAND commitment has two purposes that are in tension with 
one another: to avoid patent holdup and to ensure a reasonable return to 
patentees, in turn encouraging innovator participation in the standard-
setting process.  In order for the RAND commitment to navigate the 
tension of these dual purposes, courts must take great care in SEP cases 
to properly implement the available remedies.  These remedies have been 
the source of considerable academic and judicial disagreement. If 
injunctive relief or enhanced damages are too easily awarded, they would 
undermine the holdup-avoiding purpose of the RAND commitment.  On 
                                                          
 266.  See, e.g., City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, 266 F. Supp. 766, 771–72 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d, 
394 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (specifically enforcing agreement for option to lease property on 
terms at least as favorable as lessor had given other tenants); Morris v. Ballard, 16 F.2d 175, 176 
(D.C. Cir. 1926) (permitting specific performance of agreement to purchase property for a certain 
price with “terms to be agreed upon”); Shayeb v. Holland, 73 N.E.2d 731, 733 (Mass. 1947) 
(permitting specific performance of option to purchase land that was silent as to price, which the 
court interpreted to mean a “fair and reasonable price”); see also Chaney v. Schneider, 206 P.2d 669, 
670–71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949). 
 267.  See Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-CV-178-BBC, 2012 WL 7989412, at *3 
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 8, 2012).  There are a number of sales cases in which the parties had agreed that 
one party would have the option to purchase goods or property from the other at a reasonable price, 
but in all of those cases, the party bringing suit sought to enforce the option (in other words, the 
party with the option had affirmatively exercised it).  See, e.g., Fischer Imaging Corp. v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 187 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999); Shayeb, 73 N.E.2d at 732. 
 268.  See supra Part III.B. 
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the other hand, if these remedies are unavailable in any case, the leverage 
shifts to the implementer, who can insist on a below-RAND license rate 
without incurring any risk from willful patent infringement. 
Under the contract view of the RAND commitment, which parallels 
open-price contracts that have long been enforceable in the Article 2 
context, the RAND commitment will generally limit damages for the 
unintentional infringement of RAND-encumbered patents to a RAND 
royalty.  This royalty should be calculated in much the same way that a 
reasonable royalty is calculated in other patent contexts, with some 
minor tweaks that I discuss in this Article.  This RAND award will 
restore the injured patentee to its rightful position. 
The protective and coercive interests present more of a challenge in 
the RAND context.  In this Article, I argue that enhanced damages 
should be available in appropriate cases—that is, those in which the 
standard implementer knew of the patent, continued to infringe despite 
the absence of a substantial argument of non-infringement or invalidity, 
and acted in bad faith in response to license negotiation efforts.  
Although injunctive relief can serve the protective interest in the same 
way that enhanced damages do, enhanced damages are better positioned 
to accommodate the purposes of the RAND commitment.  Preliminary 
injunctions should not be available in cases of RAND-encumbered 
patents, and permanent prohibitory injunctions should be rare, usually 
limited to the implementer’s post-litigation refusal to take a license at a 
judicially determined RAND rate.  Also, an ongoing royalty award may 
be useful in some situations, but it should be awarded at the same RAND 
rate that the court calculated for its damages award. 
The RAND commitment can effectively encourage standard 
creation, an essential component of an increasingly interconnected 
society, but it requires circumspection in the remedies available against 
infringers of RAND-encumbered patents.  As detailed in this Article, a 
meticulous application of patent law’s existing remedial framework 
enables the RAND commitment to serve the restorative and protective 
interests—and, correspondingly, the coercive interest—without the need 
for categorical prohibitions on injunctive relief or enhanced damages. 
 
